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INTRODUCTION
On March 11, 2002, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council issued its
landmark judgments in a trilogy of cases involving defendants Peter Hughes,
Berthill Fox, and Patrick Reyes.' In these judgments, the Privy Council disposed
* Staff Attorney, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The views expressed
in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights or the Organization of American States.
' The Queen v. Hughes, [200212 W.L.R. 1058, [2002] U.K.P.C. 12, [2002] 2 A.C. 259
(appeal taken from St. Lucia); Fox v. The Queen, [2002] 2 W.L.R. 1077, [2002] U.K.P.C.
13, [2002] 2 A.C. 284 (appeal taken from St. Kitts & Nevis); Reyes v. The Queen, [2002]
2 W.L.R. 1034, [2002] U.K.P.C. 11, [2002] 2 A.C. 235 (appeal taken from Belize). See also
Watson v. The Queen, [2004] 3 W.L.R. 841, [2004] U.K.P.C. 34 (appeal taken from Jam.)
(finding the mandatory death penalty under Jamaica's Offences Against the Person
(Amendment) Act 1992 to constitute inhumane or degrading punishment under section 17(1)
of the Jamaican Constitution). In two further judgments issued on July 7, 2004, the Privy
Council determined that it was unable to pronounce the mandatory death penalty to be
unconstitutional in Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad & Tobago. The Council based its
rulings upon the "savings clauses" contained in the constitutions of those states that prevent
laws that were in existence when the constitutions came into force from being declared
invalid under the constitutions' human rights provisions. In so determining, however, the
Court maintained its position in Hughes, Fox, and Reyes that the mandatory death penalty
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under international law and the human rights
provisions of those constitutions, but held that the law could not be invalidated for that
reason. See Matthew v. The State, [2004] 3 W.L.R. 812, [2004] U.K.P.C. 33, para. 12
(appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago); Boyce v. The Queen, [2004] 3 W.L.R. 786, [2004]
U.K.P.C. 32, paras. 25, 27 (appeal taken from Barb.). The Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council remains the court of final appeal for the overseas territories and Crown
dependencies, and for those Commonwealth countries that have retained the appeal to Her
Majesty in Council or, in the case of republics, to the Judicial Committee. This jurisdiction
includes all English-speaking countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean with the exception
of Guyana. See VELMA NEWTON, COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN LEGAL SYsTEMs: A STUDY
OF SMALLJURISDICTIONs 37-38 (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc. 1989) (1988). See also Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, http://www.privy-council.org.uk (noting the court's
jurisdiction) (last visited Sept. 11, 2004).
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of appeals from decisions of the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal and the Court
of Appeal of Belize2 by concluding that the automatic imposition of the death
penalty upon conviction for a crime without an opportunity for presenting and
considering mitigating circumstances in the sentencing process - commonly
referred to as the "mandatory death penalty" - contravened the right to humane
treatment under the constitutions of St. Lucia, St. Christopher and Nevis, and Belize
not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment. These
judgments were issued subsequent to the adoption of a series of similar decisions
by the human rights supervisory bodies of the inter-American system, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, which found the mandatory death penalty in the Commonwealth
Caribbean 3 to be incompatible with the right to life, the right to humane treat-
ment, and the right to due process under regional human rights instruments.4
Among the most significant and compelling aspects of the litigation surrounding
the issue of the mandatory death penalty in the Caribbean region has been the
interplay between the procedures and jurisprudence of the inter-American human
rights system and those of relevant domestic courts. In particular, the supervisory
bodies of the inter-American system have relied upon the decisions of appellate
courts in certain states employing the death penalty, 5 and have concluded that the
practice of mandatory sentencing for the death penalty contravened applicable
international human rights norms. Subsequently, appellate courts in the Caribbean
region explicitly relied upon the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in interpreting
2 Spence v. The Queen, Crim. App. Nos. 20 of 1998 and 14 of 1997 (Apr. 2, 2001) (E.
Carib. Ct. Apps.) (appeals taken from St. Vincent & the Grenadines and St. Lucia) (judgment
from a consolidated appeal including the case of Hughes v. The Queen), at http://www.
ecsupremecourts.org.lc/index.htm.
3 For present purposes, the Commonwealth Caribbean is comprised of the twelve
English-speaking Caribbean Member States of the Organization of American States
("OAS"): Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada,
Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, and Trinidad
& Tobago.
4 See, e.g., Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin v. Trinidad & Tobago, Case 11.816, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94 (2002); McKenzie v. Jamaica, Case 12.023, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
41, OEA/ser. L.N./H.106, doc. 6 (1999), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/serie
cpdfing/seriec_94_ing.pdf (last visited Dec. 6, 2004); Edwards v. The Bahamas, Case
12.067, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 24, OEA/ser. L.N./II.106, doe. 6 (2000), available at
http://www.cidh.orglannualrep/99engladmissible/bahamasl2067.htm (last visited Dec. 6,
2004). Decisions and other publications of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights can
be found on its website at http://www.corteidh.or.cr. Decisions and other publications of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights can be found on its web site at
http://www.cidh.org.
5 The appellate courts include the United States Supreme Court, the South African
Constitutional Court, and the Supreme Court of India.
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and applying rights that are protected under national constitutions. Moreover, the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council found that the protection of due process
of law under national constitutions extend to the procedures before the inter-
American human rights system,' with the consequence that states were barred
from executing capital defendants while their pending cases were before the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and, where available, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights.7
This article provides an account of the mandatory death penalty litigation
before the inter-American human rights system and its interface with the judicial
systems of Commonwealth Caribbean states. The discussion highlights several
significant consequences that have flowed from this litigation. Contrary to the
traditional experience of the inter-American system with capital petitions, the
interaction between national and international proceedings permitted the human
rights bodies of the inter-American system to process complaints filed on behalf of
capital defendants while they were still alive through stays of execution granted
by the respective national courts. The litigation of these issues before domestic
and international tribunals also haqs prompted changes in the criminal legal
procedures of several Caribbean countries where capital defendants are now being
provided with individualized sentencing proceedings. 9 Further, the proceedings
6 See Thomas & Hilaire v. Baptiste, [1999] 3 W.L.R. 249, [2000] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) (appeal
taken from Trin. & Tobago), available at http://www.privy-council.org.uk/
output/Pagel70.asp; Lewis v. Attorney Gen. of Jamaica, [2000] 3 W.L.R. 1785, [2001] 2
A.C. 50 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.), available at http://www.privy-council.org.uk/
output/Page l69.asp.
7 Of the thirteen Commonwealth Caribbean states that are also Member States of the
OAS, only two have accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights since its creation: Trinidad & Tobago, which accepted the Court's jurisdiction
in 1991 and subsequently denounced the American Convention, and consequently the
Court's jurisdiction, in 1998; and Barbados, which accepted the Court's contentious
jurisdiction in 2000.
8 Member States of the inter-American system have generally failed to comply with
requests from the inter-American human rights bodies to stay executions pending the
investigation of complaints filed on behalf of capital petitioners. See, e.g., 2002 Annual
Report of the Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., OEA/ser. L.IV./II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1, paras. 77-78, 82-86
(2003) (describing precautionary measure requests adopted by the Commission in capital
cases in which the petitioners were executed), available at http://www.cidh.org; Hilaire,
Constantine & Benjamin, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94, para. 198 (noting
that the Republic of Trinidad & Tobago had executed one alleged victim in the case, Joey
Ramiah, notwithstanding the fact that the Court had adopted provisional measures in Mr.
Ramiah's favor).
9 See, e.g., The Queen v. Reyes, Judgment on Sentencing of Oct. 25, 2002 (unreported)
(on file with author) (appeal taken from Belize) (providing the defendant with an
individualized sentencing judgment after the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had
found the mandatory death penalty provision of the Belize Criminal Code to be
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involving the mandatory death penalty have contributed to the evolution of
domestic and international standards governing the implementation of capital
punishment," at a time when the application of the death penalty in retentionist
states is coming under enhanced domestic and international scrutiny." Finally,
unconstitutional and remitted the case back to the Belize courts); New Law to Remove
Automatic Death Penalty, JAM. OBSERVER, Oct. 6, 2004 (reporting that the Jamaican
government had tabled a bill in Parliament amending the country's Offenses Against the
Person Act to give judges greater sentencing discretion in capital murder convictions),
available at http://www.jamaicaobserver.com.
tO At the present time, several international human rights instruments permit states to
retain the death penalty, though subject to certain conditions. See, e.g., International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 6, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available
at http://www.ohchr.orglenglish/law/ccpr.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2004); American
Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica," Nov. 22, 1969, art. 4, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, OAS Off. Rec. OEA/ser. K./XVI./1.1 (entered into force July 18, 1978)
[hereinafter American Convention], reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERCAN SYSTEM 29, OEA/ser. L./V./1.4, rev. 9 (2003) [hereinafter
BASIC DocuMENTs], available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/public/B asingl0.pdf (last visited
Dec. 6, 2004). But see Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish
the Death Penalty, June 8, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 144 [hereinafter Protocol to Abolish the Death
Penalty], reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra, at 93. Despite the fact that the ICCPR
permits the death penalty, U.N. human rights bodies have consistently advocated the
abolition of the punishment. See, e.g., Question of the Death Penalty, U.N. Comm. on Hum.
Rights Res. 1997/12, U.N. Doc. E.CN. 4/1997/12 (1997); 1998/8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/8
(1998); 1999/61, U.N. Doc. E.CN. 4/1999/61 (1999); 2000/65, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/65
(2000). According to recent statistics, over one-half of world states have abolished the death
penalty in law or in practice. Amnesty International, Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty,
AI Index: ACT50/008/2004 (Apr. 2004), available at http://www.amnesty.org/death.
" Significant developments within the political and legal systems of states concerning
the application of capital punishment include the 1993 decision of the Judicial Conmittee
of the Privy Council in the case Pratt & Morgan v. Attorney Gen.for Jamaica, [ 1994] 2 A.C.
1, 4 All E.R. 769 (P.C. 1993) (appeal taken from Jam.). In Pratt & Morgan, the Committee
found that in any case in which a prisoner is to be executed more than five years after he or
she is sentenced, there are strong grounds to believe that such delay constitutes inhuman or
degrading punishment, thus rendering the execution constitutionally prohibited. See similarly
Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989). In the United States, political
developments include the decision by Illinois Governor George Ryan in January 2003 to
commute the death sentences of 167 death row inmates in that state following a commission
finding on capital punishment, convened by the Governor, that a system could not be devised
to ensure that innocent people would not be executed. See http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org
(last visited Dec. 6, 2004). In addition, on September 12, 2000, the United States Department
of Justice released the first comprehensive review of the federal death penalty since the
punishment was reinstated in 1988. The data showed, inter alia, that federal prosecutors were
almost twice as likely to recommend the death penalty for black defendants when the victim
was non-black than when the victim was black. Additionally, forty-three percent of the 183
cases in which the death penalty was sought came from forty-nine of the ninety-four federal
judicial districts, which in turn led to concerns about racial and geographic disparity in the
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the experience of the mandatory death penalty in the Caribbean illustrates the
effective role that an enlightened judiciary can play in prompting states to abide
by their international commitments, when the executive and legislative branches
of government have failed to take the necessary steps to give effect to the inter-
national human rights instruments that they themselves have undertaken to uphold
and respect.
implementation of the federal death penalty. United States Department of Justice, The
Federal Death Penalty System: A Statistical Survey (1988-2000), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/-_dpsurvey-final.pdf. See also JIM DWYER, ET AL.,
ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE
WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000). For its part, the United States Supreme Court, in Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002), concluded that the execution of mentally retarded
individuals constituted cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the 8th Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution. Also notable is the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in the case
of United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, in which the Court upheld a decision to set
aside the Minister of Justice's decision to extradite the respondents to the state of
Washington for trial on murder charges. This decision was reached without seeking
assurances from the United States, pursuant to Article 6 of the extradition treaty between the
two countries, that the death penalty would not be imposed or, if imposed, would not be
carried out. The Court based its decision in part upon the fact that "recent and continuing
disclosures of wrongful convictions for murder in Canada and the United States provide
tragic testimony to the fallibility of the legal system, despite its elaborate safeguards for the
protection of the innocent. This history weighs powerfully in the balance against extradition
without assurances when fugitives are sought to be tried for murder by a retentionist state,
however similar in other respects to our own legal system." Id. at 288.
Notable international developments on the death penalty include its abolition in Europe
as a condition of membership in the European Union, which has also been reflected in
extradition treaties with European states. See, e.g., European Convention on Extradition,
Dec. 13, 1957, art. 11, E.T.S. No. 24 (providing that extradition may be refused "[ilf the
offence for which extradition is requested is punishable by death under the law of the
requesting Party ... unless the requesting Party gives such assurance as the requested Party
considers sufficient that the death-penalty will not be carried out"). In addition, the death
penalty is not a form of punishment that may be imposed by the U.N. ad hoc tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the International Criminal Court. See Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. AICONF.183/9 (1998), art. 77; Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994),
art. 23; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res.
827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), art. 24. Also of note are the decisions of the International
Court of Justice in the LaGrand Case and the Case ofAvena and Other Mexican Nationals,
in which the Court found that the United States was responsible for Article 36 violations of
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations by failing to provide condemned prisoners
with notification of their right to consular assistance. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001
I.C.J. 104 (June 27); Case of Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.
128 (Mar. 31).
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I. BACKGROUND TO THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
Before entering into a discussion of the mandatory death penalty litigation in
the Commonwealth Caribbean, it is useful to place the analysis within the struc-
tural and procedural context of the inter-American human rights system.
A. Structure and Function of the Inter-American Human Rights System
The Organization of American States ("OAS") is an international organization
created by Western Hemisphere States in 1948 with the purposes of achieving an
order of peace and justice, promoting solidarity, and defending their sovereignty,
territorial integrity, and independence.12 The OAS Charter, the governing instru-
ment for the organization, was approved during the Ninth International Conference
of American States held in BogotA in 1948. The origins of the inter-American
regional system can be traced as far back as the 1826 Congress of Panama, where
Simon Bolivar urged participating states to consider a confederation of Latin Amer-
ican States." The system has now expanded to encompass thirty-five Member
States of North, Central, and South America.' 4
The recognition and protection of individual human rights has constituted a
subject of consideration within the inter-American system since its earliest meet-
ings and conferences, which addressed such issues as labor rights and protection
against discrimination. 5 Consistent with this tradition and as part of its agenda
"2 CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OFAMERICAN STATES, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
119 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter OAS CHARTER], reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 10,
at 233 (stipulating that the OAS is a "regional agency" within the meaning of U.N. CHARTER
art. 52).
'" For a discussion of the inter-American system's historical evolution, see THOMAS
BUERGENTHAL & DINAH SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 37-44 (4th ed. 1995). See also Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American
System for the Protection of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
LEGAL AND POLITIcAL ISSUES 429-93 (Theodor Meron, ed., 1984).
14 The thirty-five Member States of the organization are: Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, United
States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Of these, thirty-four are active members, with the
government of Cuba having been suspended since 1962. OAS CHARTER, Ratifications, OAS
Treaty Series, Nos. 1-C, 61, available at http: //www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-4 1.html
(last visited Dec. 6, 2004).
" See BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 5-6 (citing resolutions adopted by the Eighth
International Conference of American States in Lima, Peru in 1939, including the resolution
on "Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression for Workers" and the "Lima
Declaration in Favor of Women's Rights").
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in approving the OAS Charter in 1948, the Ninth International Conference of
American States adopted the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man ("American Declaration"). 6 While the American Declaration was initially
adopted on the understanding that it had not been incorporated by reference into the
Charter and lacked the status of positive substantive law, 7 the Inter-American
Commission and Court have since ruled, based upon developments since 1948, that
the American Declaration constitutes a source of international obligation for all
OAS Member States.' Also, OAS Member States, by approving the Commission's
Statute during the General Assembly's ninth regular session in 1979 and through
state practice, have recognized the Commission's authority to receive individual
petitions of American Declaration violations against Member States that are not
parties to the American Convention on Human Rights ("American Convention").19
16 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948 [hereinafter
American Declaration], reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 19.
7 See BUERGENTHAL & SHELTON, supra note 13, at 39 (citing Report of the Delegation
of the United States of America to the Ninth International Conference of American States,
Bogotd, Colombia, March 30-May 2, 1948, Department of State, at 35-36 (Publ. No. 3263,
1948)); Report of the Inter-American Council of Jurists Concerning Resolution XXXI of the
Bogotd Conference, Sept. 26, 1949, Inter-American Juridical Committee, reprinted in PAN
AMERICAN UNION, HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN STATES 163, 164-65 (prelim. ed.,
1960).
"8 See Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within
the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory
Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 10, paras. 35-45 (1989), reprinted in 29
I.C.M. 378 [hereinafter IACHR Advisory Opinion OC-10/89]; Roach & Pinkerton v. United
States, Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 3, OEA/ser. L./V./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1, paras. 46-49
(1987) (explaining the obligation of the United States, as an OAS member, regarding the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights), available athttp://www.cidh.org/annualrep/
86.87eng/EUU9647.htm.
'9 See Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS G.A. Res. 447,
9th Sess. (1979) [hereinafter Commission's Statute], reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra
note 10, at 137. Article 20 of the Commission's Statute provides:
In relation to those member states of the Organization that are not
parties to the American Convention on Human Rights, the Commission
shall have the following powers, in addition to those designated in
Article 18: a. to pay particular attention to the observance of the human
rights referred to in Articles I, 11, III, IV, XVIII, XXV, and XXVI of
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; b. to
examine communications submitted to it and any other available
information, to address the government of any member state not a Party
to the Convention for information deemed pertinent by this
Commission, and to make recommendations to it, when it finds this
appropriate, in order to bring about more effective observance of
fundamental human rights; and, c. to verify, as a prior condition to the
exercise of the powers granted under subparagraph b. above, whether
2004]
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Subsequently in 1969, during the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human
Rights held in San Jos6, Costa Rica, OAS Member States adopted the American
Convention,20 which entered into force in 1978 and serves as the main human rights
instrument of the inter-American system. The subject matter of the inter-American
human rights system has since expanded to include numerous protocols and
conventions addressing a variety of human rights issues. These protocols and
conventions include the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("Protocol of San
Salvador") 2' the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty,22 the Inter-American Convention to Prevent
and Punish Torture,23 the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of
Persons ("Forced Disappearances Convention"),24 and the Inter-American Conven-
tion on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women,
also known as the "Convention of Beldm do Par. 25
As with other intergovernmental human rights systems, the inter-American
system has created mechanisms for monitoring compliance by Member States
with their human rights commitments. In 1959, eleven years after the OAS
the domestic legal procedures and remedies of each member state not
a Party to the Convention have been duly applied and exhausted.
Id. at art. 20.
The Commission first amended its Statute to include the possibility of examining individual
petitions and making specific recommendations to Member States relative to those petitions
during its 13th Period of Sessions in 1966. See BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 8-9
(citing Report on the Work Accomplished by the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights During its Thirteenth Period ofSessionsfrom April18 to 28, 1966, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
OEA/ser. L.N./II.14, doc. 35, at 26-27 (1966)).
20 American Convention, supra note 10. As of June 2004, twenty-four OAS Member
States were parties to this convention.
21 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, "Protocol of San Salvador," Nov. 17, 1988
[hereinafter Protocol of San Salvador], reprinted in BASICDOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 79.
As of December 2004, thirteen OAS Member States were parties to this Protocol.
22 Protocol to Abolish the Death Penalty, supra note 10. As of December 2004, eight
OAS Member States were parties to this Protocol.
23 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, reprinted in
BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 97. As of December 2004, sixteen OAS Member States
were parties to this Convention.
24 Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, June 9, 1994,
reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 107. As of December 2004, ten OAS
Member States had ratified this Convention.
2 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence
Against Women, "Convention of Beltm do Pard," adopted on June 9, 1994 [hereinafter
Convention of Beltm do Pard], reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 117. As
of December 2004, thirty-one OAS Member States had ratified this Convention.
[Vol. 13:445
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Charter's adoption, Member States created the Inter-American Commission
during the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, with
the purpose of monitoring observance of the human rights recognized within the
system. 26 In 1967, the OAS Charter was amended through the Protocol of Buenos
Aires to include the Commission as an organ of the OAS, with principal responsi-
bility for promoting the observance and protection of human rights in the hemi-
sphere and serving as a consultative organ of the OAS in these matters."'
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is comprised of seven
members "of high moral character and [with] recognized competence in the field
of human rights."2 These members are elected in a personal capacity by the
General Assembly of the OAS from a list of candidates proposed by OAS Member
States. The Commission's members, who serve on a part-time basis and without
remuneration, are elected for a term of four years and may only be re-elected once.29
The Commission is supported by a full-time Secretariat based at the Commission's
headquarters in Washington, D.C., which is comprised of an Executive Secretary,
and approximately twenty attorneys and fourteen administrative personnel as well
as numerous fellows and interns. As suggested above, the Commission derives its
authority from the OAS Charter,3" the American Declaration, 3' the American
Convention, 2 the Commission's Statute,33 and its Rule of Procedure. 4 In partic-
ular, by ratifying the OAS Charter, all Member States are at a minimum subject
to the Commission's jurisdiction to receive and examine communications that
contain denunciations of alleged violations of the human rights set forth in the
American Declaration.35 The Commission is also competent to receive complaints
26 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 14.
27 OAS CHARTER, supra note 12, at arts. 112, 150.
28 Commission's Statute, supra note 19, at art. 2; Rules of Procedure of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, approved Dec. 4-8, 2000, art. 1(3) [hereinafter
Commission's Rules of Procedure], reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 147.
29 Commission's Statute, supra note 19, at arts. 3, 6.
30 OAS CHARTER, supra note 12, at arts. 112, 150.
3 American Declaration, supra note 16.
32 American Convention, supra note 10.
31 Commission's Statute, supra note 19, at art. 1(2). Providing that:
For the purposes of the present Statute, human rights are
understood to be: (a) The rights set forth in the American Convention
on Human Rights, in relation to States Parties thereto; [and] (b) The
rights set forth in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, in relation to the other member states.
Id.
4 Commission's Rules of Procedure, supra note 28.
31 See Commission's Statute, supra note 19, at art. 20; Commission's Rules of Procedure,
supra note 28, at arts. 23, 49-50; IACHR Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, supra note 18, at
paras. 35-45; Roach & Pinkerton v. United States, Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 3, OEA/ser.
L.N./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1, paras. 46-49 (1987).
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regarding violations of other treaties within the inter-American system, including
the Additional Protocol of San Salvador,36 the Forced Disappearances Convention, 3
and the Convention of Beldm do Pard.38
In addition to receiving individual complaints of human rights violations, the
Commission's functions and duties encompass a broad variety of other responsi-
bilities, including conducting on-site investigations with the Member States'
consent, providing Member States and other OAS organs with advice on human
rights matters, undertaking promotional initiatives in the area of human rights
protection, and litigating before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.39 As
the Commission is a part-time body, it generally meets in two three-week-long
Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 21, at art. 19(6). Providing that:
Any instance in which the rights established in paragraph a) of
Article 8 and in Article 13 are violated by action directly attributable
to a State Party to this Protocol may give rise, through participation of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and, when
applicable, of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, to
application of the system of individual petitions governed by Article 44
through 51 and 61 through 69 of the American Convention on Human
Rights.
Id.
31 Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, supra note 24, at art.
XIII. Providing that:
For the purposes of this Convention, the processing of petitions or
communications presented to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights alleging the forced disappearance of persons shall be
subject to the procedures established in the American Convention on
Human Rights and to the Statu[t]e [sic] and Regulations of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and to the Statute and Rules
of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, including
the provisions on precautionary measures.
Id.
See Convention of Beldm do Pard, supra note 25, at art. 12. Providing that:
Any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity
legally recognized in one or more member states of the Organization,
may lodge petitions with the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights containing denunciations or complaints of violations of Article
7 of this Convention by a State Party, and the Commission shall
consider such claims in accordance with the norms and procedures
established by the American Convention on Human Rights and the
Statutes and Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights for lodging and considering petitions.
Id.
3 See Commission's Statute, supra note 19, at arts. 18-20; Commission's Rules of
Procedure, supra note 28, at arts. 51-55, 69-74.
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regular sessions per year,4° during which time it must undertake a significant
portion of its work, including convening hearings and approving reports in
individual cases.
In 1979, the system's second human rights supervisory body, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, was created following the coming into force
of the American Convention. As defined under Article 62 of the American
Convention, the Court's "contentious" or "compulsory" jurisdiction, which involves
alleged violations of the rights of persons under the Convention by states that are
parties thereto, comprises all cases concerning the interpretation and application of
the American Convention provisions in respect of those states that have accepted the
Court's jurisdiction.4' Cases can only be referred to the Court by the Commission
or the state concerned once the Commission has decided upon the admissibility and
preliminary merits of the matter in accordance with Articles 48 through 50 of the
American Convention.42 The Court's judgments are expressly binding on those
states that have accepted its contentious jurisdiction.43 Pursuant to Article 64 of the
American Convention, the Court is also competent to issue advisory opinions at the
request of Member States of the Organization as well as certain OAS organs,
including the Commission, regarding the interpretation of the Convention or of
other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American states.
4
Like the Commission, the Inter-American Court is a part-time body comprised
of seven judges who are elected in their individual capacity by the OAS General
Assembly, and is supported by a full-time Secretariat located at the seat of the Court
in San Jos6, Costa Rica, presently comprised of a Secretary and approximately nine
staff attorneys.45 The Court conducts much of its work through two regular sessions
each year, during which time the judges convene hearings and adopt judgments in
individual cases, among other responsibilities.
It may be drawn from the above that the inter-American human rights system
is characterized by disparities in the nature and extent of treaty obligations
o See Commission's Rules of Procedure, supra note 28, at art. 14.
4' American Convention, supra note 10, at art. 62; see also Statute of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, OAS G.A. Res. 448,9th Sess. (1979) [hereinafter IACHR Statute],
reprinted in BASIc DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 181 (adopted by the General Assembly
of the OAS at its 9th Regular Session, held in La Paz, Bolivia). As of June 2004, twenty-one
OAS Member States had accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court.
See BASic DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 59.
42 American Convention, supra note 10, at art. 61.
41 id. at art. 68(1) ("The States Parties to the Convention undertake to comply with the
judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.").
" Id. at art. 64; Commission's Statute, supra note 19, at art. 2; Rules of Procedure of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, approved Nov. 16-25, 2000, arts. 59-64, reprinted
in BASic DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 216-19.
45 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, http://www.fact-index.com/i/in/
inter_americancourt_of_human-rights.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2004).
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undertaken by OAS Member States. The human rights obligations of Member
States that have ratified the American Convention, and the Commission's
corresponding supervisory authority, are primarily derived from the Convention.
In contrast, the human rights commitments of Member States that have not ratified
the American Convention and the Commission's jurisdiction in respect of those
states flow from the OAS Charter and the American Declaration. Moreover, not
every Member State that has ratified the American Convention has accepted the
contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, including,
for example, Jamaica and Grenada.' Distinctions between OAS Member States
concerning their participation in the inter-American human rights system are
further defined by language - of the twenty-four states that are parties of the
American Convention, eighteen are Spanish-speaking, with Barbados, Dominica,
Grenada, and Jamaica being the only English-speaking state parties.47 In addition,
while the eighteen Spanish-speaking state parties have also accepted the conten-
tious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court, only Barbados has done so of the
English-speaking state parties. 48 The lack of uniformity in obligations undertaken
by governments within the inter-American human rights system has presented
challenges to the Commission and the Court in attempting to recognize and promote
minimum and universally-applicable human rights standards among all OAS
Member States, while at the same time respecting distinctions in the treaty
commitments explicitly undertaken by each individual state. The Caribbean region,
having all three categories of Member States, provides a microcosm of the system's
legal disparities, which in turn affects the options available to the Commission and
the Court in processing complaints that may raise issues common to some or all of
the countries of the region, including the mandatory death penalty, as discussed
below.
Also relevant for an accurate appreciation of the mandatory death penalty
litigation in the inter-American system are the financial and other resource
constraints faced by the system's supervisory organs. As indicated above, both
the Commission and the Court operate on a part-time basis, and neither the
Commissioners nor the Judges receive remuneration for their services, with the
exception of limited stipends, travel allowances, and per diem payments relating
46 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
47 Haiti and Suriname, as non-Spanish speaking Member States, have also ratified the
Convention. The Republic of Trinidad & Tobago ratified the Convention in May 1991, but
subsequently denounced the Convention in May 1998, becoming the first Member State to
do so since the coming into force of the Convention in 1978. See BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra
note 10, at 59.
48 See Barbados Accepts Court's Jurisdiction, OAS NEWS, July-Aug. 2000,




to meetings or other functions of the Commission and Court.4 9 As a consequence,
members of the Commission and Court usually maintain their regular careers.
Moreover, the Commission and the Court have faced, and continue to face, severe
budgetary limitations in fulfilling their varied and growing responsibilities. The
OAS Program Budget for 2004, adopted by the OAS General Assembly on
June 10, 2003, authorized a total of $3,429,900 for the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights and $1,391,300 for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
or 4% and 1.6%, respectively, of the Organization's total regular budget of
$84,744,000.50 With these limited resources, the Commission and Court are
expected to fulfill their broad and demanding mandates to promote and protect
the fundamental rights of the hemisphere's approximate 869 million inhabitants.5
In comparison, the funds appropriated by the Council of Europe for the work of
the European Court of Human Rights for 2004 amounted to 39,190,000 Euros
(approximately U.S. $47,459,080), or 21.7% of the European Union's total ordinary
budget for 2004 of 180,500,000 Euros (approximately U.S. $218,585,455).12
Comparisons between the two systems must be qualified by significant structural
and other distinctions, including the operation of the European Court as a full-time
body with forty-five judges, a Registry staff of over 300, and an annual registration
of over 14,000 applications.5" Nevertheless, the disparity in funding between the
inter-American and European systems is striking, particularly in light of the fact that
both systems have historically encompassed comparable populations and that the
functions of the Commission and Court extend beyond those of the European Court
to include promotional and advisory responsibilities.
Indeed, OAS Member States have acknowledged the need to strengthen the
inter-American human rights system through, inter alia, a "substantial increase in
49 See Commission's Statute, supra note 19, at art. 13; IACHR Statute, supra note 41, at
art. 17.
50 Program-Budget of the Organizationfor2004; Quotas and Contributions to FEMCJDI
for 2004, OAS G.A. Res. 1974, 33d Sess. (2003), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/ga03/agres_1974.htm.
51 U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOciAL AFFAIRS, WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS, THE
2002 REVISION 1, U.N. Doc. ESA/P/WP. 180 (2003) (estimating the 2003 total population
of Northern America at 326 million, and of Latin America and the Caribbean at 543 million),
available athttp://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2002/WorldPop2002.PDF.
52 Resolution Res (2003)24 concerning the 2004 Ordinary Budget, Council of Eur.
Comm. of Ministers (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on Nov. 26, 2003, at the 862d
meeting of the Ministers' Deputies), available at http://wcm.coe.intlViewDoc.jsp?id
=93263&Lang=en. Conversion was based on the June 22, 2004 exchange rate of US $1.00
to 0.825764 Euros. See http://www.x-rates.com.
" See The European Court of Human rights: Historical Background, Organisation and
Procedure, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/EDocs/HistoricalBackground.htm;
Essential Guides: The European Court of Human Rights, http://www.bbc.co.uk/crime/
law/echr.shtml.
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the budget of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and that of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights so that, within a reasonable time, the
organs of the system may address their growing activities and responsibilities."'
However, little real progress has been made toward this objective. The President
of the Inter-American Commission noted at the opening of the Commission's
119th regular session in February 2004, for example, that the Commission received
twelve new mandates during the General Assembly's regular session in 2003, and
yet the Commission's regular budget had, in real terms, been reduced.5" Notwith-
standing these expressions of concern and similar statements made on behalf of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the political bodies of the OAS have
indicated as recently as March 2004 that achieving short-term increases in the
budgets of the Commission and the Court "does not appear to be a realistic goal."56
The source of this problem is principally a funding crisis faced by the OAS as a
whole - despite a significant increase in the number of mandates given to the
Organization, there has not been an increase in the Member State quotas since
1996."7 As a consequence, the Commission and Court have had to seek and heavily
rely upon external funding sources in order to function adequately.
In light of the broader context of the structural characteristics and limitations
of the inter-American system outlined above, the analysis will now turn to the
development of doctrine and jurisprudence within the system on the issue of capital
punishment.
'4 Strengthening of Human Rights Systems Pursuant to the Plan of Action of the Third
Summit of the Americas, OAS G.A. Res. 1925, 33d Sess., para. 2(a) (2003) [hereinafter OAS
General Assembly Plan], available at http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?SLang=
E&sLink=../../documents/eng/documents.asp.
" Dr. Jos6 Zalaquett, Speech of the President of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights at the Inauguration of the 119th Regular Session (Feb. 23, 2004), available
at http://www.cidh.org/Discursos/02.23.04sp.htm.
56 Report of the Chair of the Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Affairs on the
Outcome of the Studies Conducted by the Committee, Pursuant to the Mandates of the
GeneralAssembly Resolutions 1917 (XXXIII-O/03), Observations and Recommendations on
the Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS Permanent
Council, Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs, Summary of Meeting of Mar. 11,
2004, OEA/ser. G./CP/CAJP/SA.403/04, para 5 (Mar. 30, 2004).
" Observations and Recommendations on the Annual Report of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, OAS G.A. Res. 1917, 33d Sess., para. 5 (2003), available at
http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=.././documentseng/documents.asp. See
also OAS General Assembly Plan, supra note 54, at para. 4(a).
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B. The Inter-American System and the Death Penalty
As with the extent of treaty obligations assumed by OAS Member States, the
treatment of the death penalty in the inter-American human rights system reflects
a division between the practices of Spanish and English-speaking countries in the
hemisphere. Only two Spanish-speaking states retain the death penalty as part of
their laws for ordinary crimes: Cuba and Guatemala.5 8 In contrast, a majority of
the English-speaking states maintain the death penalty in their laws, including
Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana,
Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and
the United States of America.59 Partly as a consequence of this distinction in
approach, the human rights instruments of the system and the jurisprudence of the
Commission and Court have reflected both retentionist and abolitionist tendencies
in the hemisphere.
The American Convention, like the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, does not prohibit the use of the death penalty by states that retain
capital punishment.60 Rather, Article 4 of the Convention permits the application
of capital punishment by states that have not abolished the death penalty, but
subjects the use of the penalty to certain restrictions and prohibitions:
1. Every person has the right to have his life respected. This
right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment
of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries that have not abolished the death penalty,
it may be imposed only for the most serious crimes and pur-
suant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court and in
accordance with a law establishing such punishment, enacted
prior to the commission of the crime. The application of such
punishment shall not be extended to crimes to which it does not
presently apply.
3. The death penalty shall not be reestablished in states that
have abolished it.
4. In no case shall capital punishment be inflicted for polit-
ical offenses or related common crimes.
5. Capital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons
who, at the time the crime was committed, were under 18 years
58 See Amnesty International, Facts and Statistics on the Death Penalty, Retentionist
Countries, http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-countries-eng (last visited Dec. 6,
2004).
59 Id.
' American Convention, supra note 10.
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of age or over 70 years of age; nor shall it be applied to pregnant
women.
6. Every person condemned to death shall have the right to
apply for amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence, which
may be granted in all cases. Capital punishment shall not be
imposed while such a petition is pending decision by the
competent authority.6
In its seminal Advisory Opinion OC-3/83 on Restrictions to the Death
Penalty under Articles 4(2) and 4(4) of the Convention,62 the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights adopted a restrictive approach to Article 4 of the Convention.
The opinion stated that "without going so far as to abolish the death penalty, the
Convention imposes restrictions designed to delimit strictly its application and
scope, in order to reduce the application of the penalty to bring about its gradual
disappearance. 63  Additionally, the Court noted the following restrictions pre-
scribed in the Article:
Thus, three types of limitations can be seen to be applicable
to States Parties which have not abolished the death penalty.
First, the imposition or application of this sanction is subject to
certain procedural requirements whose compliance must be
strictly observed and reviewed. Second, the application of the
death penalty must be limited to the most serious common
crimes not related to political offenses. Finally, certain consid-
erations involving the person of the defendant, which may bar
the imposition or application of the death penalty, must be taken
into account.'
The Commission has interpreted the right to life protected under Article I of
the American Declaration in a similar manner. Article I, unlike Article 4 of the
American Convention, does not explicitly mention the death penalty, providing
simply that "[elvery human being has the right to life, liberty and the security of
6 Id. at art. 4. See also Protocol to Abolish the Death Penalty, supra note 10, at art. 4. In
accordance with Article 4, the Protocol enters "into force among the States that ratify or
accede to it when they deposit their respective instruments of ratification or accession with
the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States." As of June 2004, eight OAS
Member States were parties to the treaty.
62 Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Human
Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 3 (1983) [hereinafter
Restrictions to the Death Penalty].
63 Id. at para. 57.
' Id. at para. 55.
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his person.,,6' Based in part upon the drafting history for the Declaration, however,
the Commission has interpreted Article I as neither prohibiting use of the death
penalty per se, nor exempting capital punishment from the Declaration's standards
and protections altogether.' Rather, the Commission has found that Article I of
the Declaration prohibits the application of the death penalty when doing so would
result in an arbitrary deprivation of life, and has referred to the provisions of
Article 4 of the American Convention as embodying guidelines as to when the use
of capital punishment may be considered arbitrary.67
The Commission has in turn identified several deficiencies that will render an
execution arbitrary, and thus contrary to Article I of the Declaration. These include
failing to limit the death penalty to crimes of exceptional gravity prescribed by
pre-existing law,68 denying a defendant strict and rigorous judicial guarantees of
a fair trial,69 and exhibiting a notorious and demonstrable diversity of practice
within a Member State that results in inconsistent application of the death penalty
for the same crimes. °
A closer analysis of the Inter-American Commission's doctrine on capital
punishment reveals two historical lines of development. The first involves
interpretations of Article 4 of the Convention in respect of Member States of the
Caribbean, which, until the mandatory death penalty cases of the mid to late 1990s,
did not give rise to a particularly deep or insightful body of case law.71 The second
line of death penalty cases addressed by the Commission involves complaints filed
65 American Declaration, supra note 16, at art. I.
66 See Garza v. United States, Case 12.243, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 52, OEA/ser. L././II.111,
doc. 20 rev., paras. 90-91 (2001), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2000eng/
ChapterIII/MeritsIUSA 12.243.htm.
67 See e.g., Roach & Pinkerton v. United States, Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 3,
OEA/ser. L./V./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1, paras. 46-49 (1987); Andrews v. United States, Case
11.139, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 57, OEA/ser. L.IV./II.98, doc. 6 rev., paras. 175-77 (1996),
available at http://www.cidh.orglannualrep/97eng/usal 1139.htm.
68 See Andrews v. United States, Case 11.139, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 57, OEA/ser.
L./V./I1.98, doc. 6 rev., paras. 175-77 (1996), available at http:/www.cidh.org/annualrep/
97eng/ usal 1 139.htm.
69 See, e.g., id. at para. 172 (finding that in capital punishment cases, states have an
"obligation to observe rigorously all the guarantees for an impartial trial"); Thomas v.
Jamaica, Case 12.183, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 127, OEA/ser. L.N./II.114, doc. 5 rev., paras.
137-46 (2001), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2001eng/jamaica12183.htm.
70 See e.g., Roach & Pinkerton v. United States, Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 3,
OEA/ser. L./V./I1.71, doe. 9 rev. 1, para. 61 (1987).
"' For example, between 1980 and 1996, only eight reports were published by the
Commission in respect of English-speaking Caribbean countries, which were comprised
almost entirely of complaints concerning due process protections in death penalty
proceedings in Jamaica. For a more detailed discussion of the pre-mandatory death penalty
cases arising in the Caribbean in the mid- to late-1980's, see infra notes 106-14 and
accompanying text.
20041
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
against the United States under the American Declaration. These complaints
have raised a variety of discrete issues, including the execution of juvenile
offenders,72 racial discrimination in the capital prosecution process,73 and, more
recently, due process issues pertaining to non-compliance with the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations on the execution of foreign nationals74 and
the introduction of evidence of unadjudicated crimes at the sentencing phase of
criminal proceedings.
7 15
In addition to its merits decisions on death penalty petitions arising out of the
United States and the Caribbean, the Commission has also developed a practice
of adopting "precautionary measures" pursuant to Article 25 of its Rules of
Procedure. These measures favor the capital petitioner whose complaints meet the
requirements of the Rules of Procedure and are transmitted to the Member State
concerned, in effect acting as an injunction to avoid frustrating the restitutio in
integrum of the condemned prisoner and thereby preventing irreparable harm.76
72 Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 62, OEA/ser. L.N./II. 117,
doc. 1 rev. 1 (2002), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/usa. 12285.htm;
Beazley v. United States, Case 12.412, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 101, OEA/ser. L.N./II. 118, doc.
5 rev. 2 (2003), available at http://www.cidh.orglannualrep/2003eng/usa.12.412.htm;
Thomas v. United States, Case 12.240, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 100, OEA/ser. L./V./IlI.118, doc.
5 rev. 2 (2003), available at http://www.cidh.orglannualrep/2003eng/usa. 12240htm; Roach
& Pinkerton v. United States, Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 3, OEA/ser. L./V./II.71, doc. 9
rev. 1 (1987), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/86.87eng/EUU9647.htm.
13 See, e.g., Andrews v. United States, Case 11.139, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 57, OEA/ser.
L./V.II.98, doc. 6 rev., paras. 175-77 (1996), available at http:llwww.cidh.org/annualrep/
97eng/usal 1139.htm; Celestine v. United States, Case 10.031 Inter-Am. C.H.R. 23, OEA/ser.
L.V./II.77, doe. 7 rev. 1 (1989), available at http:/www.cidh.org/annualrep/89.90eng/
usal0.031 .htm.
71 See, e.g., Fierro v. United States, Case. 11.331, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 99, OEA/ser.
L.N./II. 118, doc. 5 rev. 2 (2003) available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2003eng/
usa.11331.htm; Villareal v. United States, Case 11.753, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 108, OEA/ser.
L.IV./I.111 (2000), available at http://www.cidh.org/ annualrep/2000eng/chapteriii/
admissible/usa 11.753.htm.
75 See Garza, Case 12.243, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 52, at paras. 90-91.
76 Commission's Rules of Procedure, supra note 28, art. 25. Providing that:
1. In serious and urgent cases, and whenever necessary according
to the information available, the Commission may, on its own initiative
or at the request of a party, request that the State concerned adopt
precautionary measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons.
2. If the Commission is not in session, the President, or, in his or
her absence, one of the Vice-Presidents, shall consult with the other
members, through the Executive Secretariat, on the application of the
provision in the previous paragraph. If it is not possible to consult
within a reasonable period of time under the circumstances, the
President or, where appropriate, one of the Vice-President [sic] shall
take the decision on behalf of the Commission and shall so inform its
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Through these precautionary measures, the Commission requests that the State
concerned stay the execution of a petitioner until the Commission has an oppor-
tunity to investigate his or her complaints.77 Indeed, the Commission, similar to
other international adjudicative bodies, has held that OAS Member States are
subject to an international legal obligation to comply with requests for precaution-
ary measures where, as in capital cases, the measures are considered essential to
preserving the Commission's mandate under the OAS Charter.7"
These developments in the case law of the Inter-American Commission have
been accompanied by several significant decisions of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights in connection with the use of capital punishment. Advisory opinions
issued by the Court concerning the death penalty include Advisory Opinion
OC-3/83, 79 in which the Court addressed the permissibility of extending the death
penalty to new crimes that had not been subject to that punishment when the
Convention entered into force for a particular state. Additionally, in Advisory
Opinion OC-14/94,8° the Commission asked the Court to address the international
legal implications for a state that reintroduces the death penalty after it has been
abolished in contravention of Article 4(3) of the Convention. In Advisory Opinion
OC-16/99,8 ' the Court analyzed the due process implications of a state's failure
members.
3. The Commission may request information from the interested
parties on any matter related to the adoption and observance of the
precautionary measures.
4. The granting of such measures and their adoption by the State
shall not constitute a prejudgment on the merits of a case.
Id.
7' For a yearly summary of the precautionary measures adopted by the Commission
between 1996-2002, including measures in death penalty cases in the United States, the
Caribbean region, and Guatemala, see chapter III in each of the Commission's Annual
Reports for the years 1996-2003.
71 See, e.g., Garza, Case 12.243, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 52, paras. 90-91 (citing James v.
Trinidad & Tobago, Order for Provisional Measures of Aug. 29, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. E) No. 2 (1998)); Inter-Am. C.H.R., at 317 (1998); Case Concerning the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 104 (Mar. 3), paras. 22-28
(order granting provisional measures); Ocalan v. Turkey, No. 46221/99, 125 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2003) (order granting interim measures pursuant to rule 39 of the European Court of Human
Rights); Piandiong v. Philippines, Case 869/1999, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc.
CCPRIC/70/D/869/1999, paras. 5.1-5.4 (2000), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbsl
doc.nsfI0/8498694eee98082ac 12569eb0034flbb?Opendocument.
'9 Restrictions to the Death Penalty, supra note 62.
" International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in
Violation of the Convention (Arts. 1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights),
Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 14 (1994).
S The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees
of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) No. 16
(1999).
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to comply with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in
respect of a foreign national who has been tried and convicted of a capital crime
and sentenced to death. Additionally, on June 21, 2002, the Court issued its first
judgment on merits and reparations in a contentious proceeding in the case of
Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin v. Trinidad & Tobago.82 This case addressed
the compatibility of the mandatory death penalty with the American Convention,
among other issues connected with capital proceedings, and is the subject of further
discussion below.
Historically, therefore, the inter-American human rights supervisory bodies
have been active in grappling with the issue of the death penalty in an inter-
national context. It was not until the mid-1990s, however, that the issue of capital
punishment became a critical challenge to the inter-American system in the
Caribbean region.
1I. THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION - CRISIS IN THE 1990S
Commonwealth Caribbean Member States of the OAS have played a
longstanding but relatively uncontroversial role in the inter-American human
rights system in comparison with the struggles against military dictatorships, armed
conflicts, and other deep-seated problems that the Inter-American Commission and
Court have historically faced in other parts of the hemisphere. Beginning in the
mid-1990s, this situation changed when the death penalty issue in the Caribbean
became a matter of enhanced scrutiny and debate on several fronts: in the dis-
course of local politics; in litigation before domestic courts; in foreign relations,
particularly between Caribbean states and Great Britain; and in the international
organizations of which the states are members.8 3 The convergence of these
developments set the stage for an unprecedented political and juridical struggle
over the conditions under which capital punishment would continue to be utilized
in the Caribbean region. It also resulted in an urgent situation for the inter-
American human rights system, which became a central arena for this struggle.
A. Increased Use of the Death Penalty and Significant Decisions of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council
Beginning in the 1990s, the Caribbean region called for a more aggressive use
of the death penalty, following a period in which the punishment was applied
relatively infrequently. This increased endorsement of capital punishment was
82 Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin v. Trinidad & Tobago, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 94 (2002).
83 Pratt & Morgan v. Attorney Gen. for Jamaica, [1994] 2 A.C. 1, 4 All E.R. 769 (P.C.




associated with the social and economic effects of rising crime rates throughout
the Caribbean region and the adoption of more aggressive anti-crime programs.8
Countering this upsurge in the invocation of the death penalty was a coordi-
nated strategy developed by barristers and solicitors in London, together with
associates in some Caribbean states, to challenge aspects of the penalty through
litigation at the domestic and international levels. Among the challenges raised by
London firms was the "death row phenomenon" - concerning the effects of
prolonged incarceration on death row, as well as the mandatory nature of the death
penalty under the legislation of most Caribbean jurisdictions. 85 In some instances,
judicial challenges to the death penalty were complicated by the existence of
"saving clauses" in the constitutions of most Commonwealth Caribbean states,
which were designed to exempt pre-independence laws, including those governing
capital punishment, from challenge for being contrary to provisions of the new
Bills of Rights in those countries.86
The efforts of the London attorneys resulted in a series of Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council decisions that had a profound impact upon the standards and
procedures for applying the death penalty in the region, including the role of
international human rights instruments and supervisory bodies. The most salient
of these decisions, which are reviewed briefly below, include Pratt & Morgan v.
" See David A. C. Simmons, Conflicts of Law and Policy in the Caribbean - Human
Rights and the Enforcement of the Death Penalty - Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 9 J.
TRANSNAL'L L. & POL'Y 263, 266 (2000). See also Amnesty International, The Death
Penalty Worldwide: Developments in 1999, Al Index: ACT50/004/2000 (Apr. 2000) (noting
that in June 1999 Trinidad & Tobago executed nine people in the first executions in that
country in five years); Amnesty International, Death Penalty News: December 1996, AI
Index: ACT53/001/1997 (Jan. 1997) (indicating that Jamaica was expected to resume
executions after a gap of eight years, based upon comments by the Minister of National
Security of that country to Parliament on October 29, 1996, and that a new crime-fighting
plan would be implemented due to the high level of crime and violence in the country).
85 See Patrick Hudson, Does the Death Row Phenomenon Violate a Prisoner's Human
Rights Under International Law?, 11 EUR. J. OFINT'LL. 433 (2000), available at http://ejil.
oupjournals.org/cgilcontent/abstract/1 1/4/833.
6 SeeNEWTON, supra note 1, at 37-38 (Newton notes that the constitutions of Barbados,
the Bahamas, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago contain "savings clauses,"
and that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, still the highest court of appeal for all
such jurisdictions except Guyana, has demonstrated a mixed willingness to limit the extent
to which pre-independence laws can be shielded from review under the Bills of Rights. In
a series of recent cases, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has had occasion to
consider the constitutional validity of these savings clauses.); see infra note 276 and
accompanying text; Saul Lehrfreund, International Trends and the "Mandatory Death
Penalty" in the Commonwealth Caribbean, 1 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L. J. 1171
(2001).
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Attorney General for Jamaica,7 Thomas & Hilaire v. Baptiste,8 and Lewis v.
Attorney General of Jamaica.8 9
Among the most controversial decisions of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council concerning the application of the death penalty in the Caribbean
region was its 1993 judgment in Pratt & Morgan v. Attorney General for
Jamaica.9° In Pratt & Morgan, a majority of the Lords hearing the case accepted
the doctrine of the "death row phenomenon,"' finding that the execution of the
death sentence after an unconscionable delay would constitute a contravention of
a constitutional provision protecting the right to humane treatment except where
the delay had resulted from the fault of the defendant.92 According to the Privy
Council, capital punishment can only be retained if it is carried out with all possible
expedition. Moreover, the Council specifically opined that if an execution takes
place more than five years after sentencing, there will be "strong grounds for
believing that the delay is such as to constitute inhuman degrading punishment or
other treatment.- 93 Of particular relevance to the inter-American human rights
system, the Privy Council held that where defendants pursue claims before
international bodies such as the UN Human Rights Committee ("UNHRC") or the
Inter-American Commission, the five-year time period suggested by the court
included a period of eighteen months in which those claims are to be determined. 94
In reaching this conclusion, the Privy Council observed that the UNHRC and, by
implication, the Inter-American Commission, did not consider its role to be that of
a further appellate court:
It therefore appears to their Lordships that provided there is
in [the] future no unacceptable delay in the domestic proceed-
ings[,] complaints to the UNHRC from Jamaica should be
infrequent and when they do occur it should be possible for the
Committee to dispose of them with reasonable dispatch and at
most within eighteen months.95
'7 Pratt & Morgan v. Attorney Gen. for Jamaica, [1994] 2 A.C. 1, 4 All E.R. 769 (P.C.
1993), available at http://www.privy-council.org.uk/output/Page 17 1.asp.
88 Thomas & Hilaire v. Baptiste, [1999] 3 W.L.R. 249, [2000] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) (appeal
taken from Trin. & Tobago), available at http://www.privy-council.org.uk/output/
Pagel70.asp.
89 Lewis v. Attorney Gen. of Jamaica, [20001 3 W.L.R. 1785, [2001] 2 A.C. 50 (P.C.)
(appeal taken from Jam.), available athttp://www.privy-council.org.ukloutput/Pagel69.asp.
90 Pratt & Morgan, [1994] 2 A.C. 1, 4 All E.R. 769.
"' See also Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 92 (1989).






As discussed below, this decision drastically affected relations between the
Caribbean States and both the UNHRC and the Inter-American Commission by
pressing these bodies to accelerate their determination of cases, notwithstanding
their increasing case loads and limited resources.
The next Privy Council judgment having a significant impact upon the
processing of capital proceedings before both the domestic courts and interna-
tional human rights bodies was its January 27, 1999 order in the Trinidadian case
of Thomas & Hilaire v. Baptiste, the reasons for which were subsequently issued
on March 17, 1999.96 In this decision, the Privy Council augmented the links
between the inter-American human rights system and domestic legal restraints upon
Caribbean Member States in implementing the death penalty by precluding the
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago from executing condemned prisoners until their
complaints had been determined before the inter-American system. According to
the Council, "[f]or the Government to carry out the sentences of death before the
[inter-American] petitions have been heard would deny the appellants their
constitutional right to due process."97 As a consequence, the Privy Council ordered
that the carrying out of the said death sentences be stayed, until the applicants'
petitions to the Commission had been determined and any Commission report or
Inter-American Court ruling had been considered by the authorities in Trinidad and
Tobago. The Privy Council also indicated that the stay would apply to other
prisoners under sentence of death in Trinidad and Tobago who had lodged petitions
under the American Convention, which at the time included six other condemned
prisoners, and eventually expanded to encompass thirty-eight death row inmates
in that State.98
In its reasons for judgment, the Privy Council acknowledged arguments
proffered by the State that in common law systems derived from the British
model, international conventions do not alter domestic law except to the extent
that they are incorporated into domestic law by legislation.9 The Council found,
96 Thomas & Hilaire, [1999] 3 W.L.R. 249, [2000] 2 A.C. 1.
97 Id.
9' See James v. Trinidad & Tobago, Order for Provisional Measures, Inter-Am. Ct. HR.
(ser. E) Nos. 1-3 (1998).
99 Thomas & Hilaire, [1999] 3 W.L.R. 249, [2000] 2 A.C. 1. Stating that:
Their Lordships recognise the constitutional importance of the
principle that international conventions do not alter domestic law
except to the extent that they are incorporated into domestic law by
legislation. The making of a treaty, in Trinidad and Tobago as in
England, is an act of the executive government, not of the legislature.
It follows that the terms of a treaty cannot effect any alteration to
domestic law or deprive the subject of existing legal rights unless and
until enacted into domestic law by or under authority of the legislature.
When so enacted, the Courts give effect to the domestic legislation, not
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however, that this principle did not preclude giving effect to the inter-American
petition system by way of the act of the Executive Branch in ratifying the American
Convention. In the Privy Council's view, the ratification of the American
Convention by the Executive extended the due process protections under the
Trinidad and Tobago Constitution and common law to condemned inmates'
proceedings before the inter-American system. Therefore, the stays were grounded
in the enforcement of domestic law. The Privy Council explained that:
the appellant's claim does not infringe the principle which the
Government invokes. The right for which [the appellants]
contend is not the particular right to petition the Commission
or even to complete the particular process which they ini-
tiated when they lodged their petitions. It is the general right
accorded to all litigants not to have the outcome of any pending
appellate or other legal process pre-empted by executive action.
This general right is not created by the Convention; it is ac-
corded by the common law and affirmed by section 4(a) of the
Constitution."° The appellants are not seeking to enforce the
terms of an unincorporated treaty, but a provision of the
domestic law of Trinidad and Tobago contained in the Constitu-
tion. By ratifying a treaty which provides for individual access
to an international body, the Government made that process for
the time being part of the domestic criminal justice system and
thereby temporarily at least extended the scope of the due
process clause in the Constitution.'0 '
With these words, the Privy Council articulated an innovative approach to the
interconnection between international human rights mechanisms and the domestic
criminal processes of states having a common law tradition, which afforded
to the terms of the treaty. The many authoritative statements to this
effect are too well know to need citation.
Id.
'0' TmIN. & TOBAGO CONST. § 4(a). The constitution provides:
It is hereby recognised and declared that in Trinidad and Tobago
there have existed and shall continue to exist, without discrimination
by reason of race, origin, colour, religion or sex, the following
fundamental human rights and freedoms, namely-(a) the right of the
individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of
property and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process
of law.
Id., available at http://www.ttparliament/org/docs/constitution/ttconst.pdf
10 Thomas & Hilaire, [1999] 3 W.L.R. 249, [2000] 2 A.C. 1.
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domestic constitutional protection to the procedures before the supervisory
mechanisms created under the human rights instruments to which the state was
subject.
The Privy Council also rejected the government's contention that the process
before the inter-American system was not a legal process and therefore not subject
to the constitutional requirement of due process. In so finding, the Privy Council
recognized that, as Trinidad and Tobago had accepted the contentious jurisdiction
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, a defendant's petitions might be
referred to the Inter-American Court, and noted that the Inter-American Court's
rulings are "binding" upon Trinidad and Tobago according to the terms of the
American Convention.'°2
In Thomas & Hilaire, the Privy Council also revisited its pronouncement in
Pratt & Morgan of a "five-year" maximum period. Apparently recognizing the
limited capacity of international human rights systems, the Privy Council concluded
that, in hindsight, it may have been "unduly optimistic 10 3 in prescribing an
eighteen-month period inclusive of proceedings before the UNHRC and the
Inter-American Commission. As a consequence, the Council held that if more
than eighteen months elapse between the date that a condemned prisoner lodges a
petition to the Commission and its final determination, an appropriate remedy would
be to add the excess time to the eighteen-month period allowed for the completion
of the international processes in death penalty cases. In effect, the Privy Council
considered that the delay before the international process, while it may be taken
into account by the Advisory Committee on the Power of Pardon, should not prevent
the death sentence from being carried out.'O° The change in the Privy Council's
approach also appears to have been prompted by a reevaluation of the legal basis
for state responsibility in cases of delay, with the Law Lords observing:
[T]he ratio of Pratt, that a state which wishes to retain capital
punishment must accept responsibility of ensuring that the
appellate system is not productive of excessive delay, is not
1o2 Id. It is notable, however, that the Privy Council subsequently granted stays in favor
of condemned prisoners in states that had not accepted the Court's contentious jurisdiction.
In Lewis, for example, the Privy Council extended the reasoning of Thomas & Hilaire to
Jamaica, by concluding that the "protection of the law" clause under the Jamaican
Constitution, like the "due process of law" clause under the Trinidad & Tobago Constitution,
required the Jamaican government to stay a condemned prisoner's execution until the reports
of the human rights bodies to which the prisoner had petitioned have been received and
considered; see Lewis, [2000 3 W.L.R. 1785, [2001] 2 A.C. 50. It therefore appears that
access to the Court's contentious procedure is not considered a condition precedent to the
availability of injunctive relief for defendants who petition the inter-American system.
113 Thomas & Hilaire, [1999] 3 W.L.R. 249, [2000] 2 A.C. 1.
104 id.
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appropriate to international legal processes which are beyond the
control of the state concerned. Prompt determination by human
rights bodies of applications from men condemned to death is
more likely to be achieved if delay in dealing with them does not
automatically lead to commutation of the sentence."5
The third significant Judicial Committee of the Privy Council decision
addressing the implementation of capital punishment in light of applicable human
rights standards and mechanisms was Lewis v. Attorney General of Jamaica.1°6
In this case, a majority of the judges considering the matter concluded that the
executive's authority to grant the Prerogative of Mercy, exercised in Jamaica by
the Privy Council of Jamaica, must operate under "fair and proper" procedures.'
7
In reaching this conclusion, the Board diverted from its previous case law accord-
ing to which the exercise of the Prerogative of Mercy was considered purely
discretionary and therefore not subject to judicial review.0 8
The Privy Council found that fair and proper procedures in the mercy process
require, inter alia, that a condemned individual be given sufficient notice of the
date on which the competent authorities will consider his or her case, be afforded
the opportunity to make representations in support of his or her case, and receive
copies of the documents that will be considered by the competent authorities in
making a decision on whether to exercise the Prerogative of Mercy in favor of the
individual.' °9 Moreover, the Judicial Committee held that when the report of the
international human rights bodies is available it should be considered, and if the
Jamaican Privy Council does not accept the report an explanation why should be
given.'' Further, the Privy Council required Jamaica, like Trinidad, to stay the
execution of condemned prisoners until the reports of the human rights bodies to
which the prisoner has petitioned have been received and considered."' Concerning
the role of international processes vis-A-vis the time limit in Pratt & Morgan, the
Privy Council appeared to revert to its previous position that both domestic and
international procedures must be completed within five years of sentencing, but
conditioned this standard by acknowledging that the international bodies concerned
"meet infrequently and are undermanned""' and accordingly that "it may be that
105 Id. (emphasis omitted).
i06 Lewis, [2000] 3 W.L.R. 1785, [2001] 2 A.C. 50.
107 id.
10' See, e.g., de Freitas v. Benny, [1975] 3 W.L.R. 388, [1976] A.C. 239 (P.C. 1975)
(appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago); Reckley v. Minister of Pub. Safety & Immigration,
[1996] 2 W.L.R. 281, [1996] U.K.P.C. 1, [1996] A.C. 517 (appeal taken from Bah.).






a few months over the eighteen months will have to be accepted."'" 3 The Council
ultimately determined that the death sentences of the six appellants should be set
aside; in four of the cases, the five-year period had already expired, in the remain-
ing two cases, it was inevitable that the five years would be surpassed by the time
the appropriate remedial steps were taken through the domestic mercy process in
accordance with the Council's decision.114
Therefore, beginning with the Pratt & Morgan decision, the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council issued a series of judgments over a seven-year period that
radically changed the conditions governing the application of the death penalty in
the Caribbean by requiring that executions be carried out, in general, within five
years of sentencing. This five-year period is inclusive of the time needed for
pursuing procedures before international bodies such as the Commission. The
Council, in addition, prohibited the execution of condemned inmates while their
complaints were pending before pertinent international human rights bodies such as
the Commission, and mandated that the Prerogative of Mercy be regulated through
procedures that are fair and proper." 5
The decisions of the Privy Council in Pratt & Morgan and subsequent death
penalty cases were met with intense condemnation on the part of Caribbean
governments. Critics contended that the decisions illustrated the Privy Council's
lack of appreciation of the criminal justice challenges faced by governments in
the Caribbean region, and that the combined effect of the judgments amounted to
the de facto abolition of the death penalty."6  The frustration of Caribbean
governments was exacerbated by the contemporaneous increase in the number of
death penalty petitions lodged against them with the inter-American system, as
discussed below, which have placed additional pressure on the Commission and the
Court to develop expeditious strategies for managing the complaints."
7
B. Impact of Domestic Developments Concerning the Death Penalty upon the
Inter-American Human Rights System
Commonwealth Caribbean Member States have played a long-standing role
in the inter-American system. Caribbean states were among the first to ratify the
American Convention, with Jamaica and Grenada ratifying in 1978 and Barbados
in 1981.118 Indeed, Grenada's ratification brought the American Convention into




116 See Simmons, supra note 84, at 266.
"7 See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
1' American Convention, supra note 10.
20041
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
the Inter-American Commission and Court for many years. At present, the
Commission's composition includes Clare K. Roberts from Antigua and Barbuda,
who commenced his term in 2002. Commissioner Roberts was preceded by Peter
Laurie of Barbados, who served from 2000 to 2002, completing the term of Sir
Henry Forde, another Barbadian, who commenced his term in 1998. Commissioner
Forde in turn was preceded by John S. Donaldson of Trinidad and Tobago, who
served from 1994 to 1997, Patrick Lipton Robinson of Jamaica, who served from
1988 to 1995, and Oliver Jackman of Barbados, who served on the Commission
from 1986 until 1993 when he was elected a Judge of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights.'19
At the same time, the Member States of the Caribbean region have not,
historically, been the source of voluminous litigation before the Commission.
Between 1980 and 1996, for example, only eight reports were published by the
Commission in respect of English-speaking Caribbean countries, which were
comprised almost entirely of complaints concerning due process protections in
death penalty proceedings in Jamaica. 20 The Commission found violations of
the American Convention in only one of these cases, that of Clifton Wright.'
2
'
In the remaining cases, the Commission found that the petitioners' complaints of
due process were not well-founded, while at the same time recommending that




(last visited Dec. 6, 2004).
120 Riley v. Jamaica, Case 3102, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 25, OEA/ser. L.N./II.57, doc. 6 rev.
1 (1981); Thomas v. Jamaica, Case 3115, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 24, OEA/ser. L.IV.II.57, doc.
6 rev. 1 (1981); Morris v. Jamaica, Case 3552, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 60, OEA/ser. L./V.II.61,
doc. 22 rev. 1 (1982) (referencing identical unreported resolutions in 8 additional cases,
3553,3554,7500,7503,7506,7507,7509, and 7514); Edwards v. Jamaica, Case 7604, Inter-
Am. C.H.R. 7, OEA/ser. L./V.III.63, doc. 10 (1984); Pratt v. Jamaica, Case 9054, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. 13, OEA/ser. L./V.II.66, doc. 10 rev. 1 (1984); Champagnie v. Jamaica, Case 7505,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 27, OEA/ser. L./VII.68, doc. 8 rev. 1 (1986); Cuthbert v. Jamaica, Case
9190, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 28, OEA/ser. L./V./II.68, doc. 8 rev. 1 (1986); Wright v. Jamaica,
Case 9260, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 29, OEA/ser. L.N./II.74, doc. 10 rev. 1 (1988).
121 Wright, Case 9260, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 29 (1988) (The Commission found violations of
the right to judicial protection under Article 25 of the Convention because evidence as to the
physical impossibility of the petitioner having committed the crime, namely the fact that he
was in custody at the time the murder was committed, was discovered before the appeal to
the Privy Council but was not considered by any courts. The Commission recommended
Jamaica investigate and provide the victim with a judicial remedy to correct the
inconsistency.).
122 See, e.g., Morris, Case 3552, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 60 (1982). The Commission resolved:
1. A study of the notes of evidence of the Jamaican Courts and the
conduct of the trial of Davlin Morris show that the rules of criminal
procedure of Jamaica were observed and that the plaintiff received a
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This state of affairs began to change dramatically in 1996 when advocates
based in London began lodging petitions that addressed, among other issues, the
mandatory nature of the death penalty in many of the English-speaking Caribbean
states. Between 1996 and 2001, the Commission received approximately ninety-
seven petitions concerning the death penalty in the Caribbean, which amounted
to approximately ten percent of the Commission's average backlog of 950 active
petitions and cases. 2 3 Of these, the largest number was filed against Jamaica and
the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. 24 The exceptional volume of death penalty
cases was accompanied by a particular situation of urgency, stemming from the fact
that the petitions involved imminent threats to the lives of the petitioners.
At the same time, governments in the region began pressing the Commission
and the UNHRC to process the petitions as expeditiously as possible so as not
to exacerbate the condemned prisoners' post-conviction delay in light of the
Pratt & Morgan decision.' Some governments also attempted to mitigate the
fair trial.
2. The plaintiff was assisted by defense counsel;
3. The plaintiff, Davlin Morris, lost his appeal on his conviction
and sentence on May 21, 1975; therefore it is apparent that all legal
remedies have been exhausted.
Id. The Commission further resolved:
1. To declare that there exists no evidence of the violation of any
of the rights set forth in the American Convention on Human Rights.
2. To communicate this resolution to the Government of Jamaica
and to the plaintiff, and
3. To recommend that the Government of Jamaica suspend the
execution of those persons sentenced to death and consider the
abolition of the death penalty.
Id.
123 See, e.g., 1999-2001 Annual Reports of the Inter. Am. C.H.R., ch. III.B.
124 The mandatory death penalty petitions lodged with the Commission between 1994 and
2001 were distributed among Caribbean Member States as follows: Trinidad & Tobago: 51;
Jamaica: 26; The Bahamas: 10; Barbados: 5; Grenada: 4; Belize: 1. These figures included
petitions in which the death sentences of the defendants concerned were commuted after
complaints had been filed with the inter-American system. Id.
'25 On February 20, 1998, for example, then-Attorney General of Trinidad & Tobago,
Ramesh Maharaj, appeared before the Commission to explain the impact of Pratt & Morgan
on the implementation of the death penalty in that state and to request that the Commission
guarantee the expeditious consideration of Trinidadian capital cases before it by complying
with certain time limits prescribed by the State itself. In his statement to the Commission, the
Attorney General contended that by failing to expedite capital cases and thereby further
delaying the prisoners' time on death row, the Commission itself was contributing to the
perpetration of cruel and inhuman treatment as defined by the Privy Council under Trinidad's
domestic law. Moreover, the Attorney General asserted that the Commission had no
jurisdiction to interfere in the implementation of a sentence of death imposed by a court of
competent jurisdiction in Trinidad & Tobago. Thus, according to the Attorney General, it
20041
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
implications of the Privy Council's rulings through legislative measures, including
in particular the promulgation of "Governor General's Instructions,"' 26 which
purported to prescribe an eighteen-month limit within which the UNHRC,
Commission, and Court would have to finally decide petitions submitted to
them.'27 The Privy Council subsequently found these instructions to be unlawful
and therefore of no effect.1
28
In perhaps the most dramatic turn of events during this period, the Republic
of Trinidad and Tobago on May 26, 1998, delivered to the Secretary General of
the OAS its notice denouncing the American Convention, 29 the first state to do so
would be open for the Government of Trinidad & Tobago, while a petition is pending before
the Commission, to carry out a sentence of death once the five-year time limit had expired.
In that circumstance the Commission might recommend the award of compensation to a
victim. See Hon. Ramesh L. Maharaj, Attorney General of Trinidad & Tobago, Statement
to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Concerning Compliance with
TimeFrames for the Consideration of Petitions in Capital Cases (Feb. 20, 1988).
126 See, e.g., A. Leung Woo-Gabriel, Instructions Relating to Applications from Persons
Under Sentence of Death, 36 TRIN. & TOBAGO GAZETE (EXTRAORDINARY) 855-56 (Oct.
13, 1997).
127 Id.
28 In Thomas & Hilaire, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council addressed the
legality of "Instructions" promulgated by the Executive in Trinidad & Tobago, which
purported to establish time limits within which the Commission and the UNHRC were
obliged to issue determinations on the merits of complaints concerning the death penalty. The
Privy Council concluded that these Instructions were unlawful because they were
disproportionate in that they contemplated the possibility of successive applications to the
Commission and the UNHRC and laid down a series of successive and unnecessarily
curtailed time limits for the taking of the several steps involved in the making of successive
applications to both international bodies. See Thomas & Hilaire v. Baptiste, [1999] 3
W.L.R. 249, [2000] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago), available at
http://www.privy-council.org.uk/output/Pagel70.asp.
29 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trinidad & Tobago, Notice to Denounce the American
Convention of Human Rights (May 26, 1998). Article 78 of the Convention permits a State
Party to denounce the Convention in the following terms:
1. The States Parties may denounce this Convention at the
expiration of a five-year period from the date of its entry into force and
by means of notice given one year in advance. Notice of the
denunciation shall be addressed to the Secretary General of the
Organization, who shall inform the other States Parties.
2. Such a denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing the
State Party concerned from the obligations contained in this
Convention with respect to any act that may constitute a violation of
those obligations and that has been taken by that state prior to the
effective date of denunciation.
American Convention, supra note 10, at art. 10.
It is notable that by the terms of this provision, Trinidad remains bound by its
obligations under the Convention in respect of any act that is taken by the state prior to the
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since the Convention entered into force in 1978. In its instrument of denunciation,
the government indicated that its decision had resulted from the Commission's
failure to guarantee compliance with the time frames proposed by Trinidad in its
Governor General's Instructions." Trinidad's denunciation starkly illustrated the
effective date of the denunciation, May 26, 1999. The Commission has interpreted this
provision as preserving the Commission's jurisdiction to receive and process alleged
violations of the Convention as against Trinidad after May 26, 1999, provided that those
violations relate to acts alleged to have taken place prior to that date, and the Commission
has in fact continued to receive such petitions. See Roodal v. Trinidad & Tobago, Case
12.342, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 89, OEA/ser. L.IV./II.1 14, doc 5. rev., para. 23 (2001), available
at http://cidh.org/annualrep/2001 engTT12342.htm. The Commission held:
By the plain terms of Article 78(2), states parties to the American
Convention have agreed that a denunciation taken by any of them will
not release the denouncing state from its obligations under the
Convention with respect to acts taken by that state prior to the effective
date of the denunciation that may constitute a violation of those
obligations. A state party's obligations under the Convention
encompass not only those provisions of the Convention relating to the
substantive rights and freedoms guaranteed thereunder. They also
encompass provisions relating to the supervisory mechanisms under the
Convention, including those under Chapter VII of the Convention
relating to the jurisdiction, functions and powers of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. Notwithstanding Trinidad and
Tobago's denunciation of the Convention, therefore, the Commission
will retain jurisdiction over complaints of violations of the Convention
by Trinidad and Tobago in respect of acts taken by that State prior to
May 26, 1999. Consistent with established jurisprudence, this includes
acts taken by the State prior to May 26, 1999, even if the effects of
those acts continue or are not manifested until after that date.
Id. (citations omitted).
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights appears to have shared the Commission's
interpretation of Article 78 by explicitly considering in its Judgments on Preliminary
Objections and Merits in Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin, that Trinidad's denunciation
could not have the effect of releasing it from its obligations with respect to the facts
presented by the Petitioners, notwithstanding that many of the petitions were lodged with the
Commission after the effective date of Trinidad's denunciation. See, e.g., Hilaire v. Trinidad
& Tobago, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 80, para. 28 (2001); Hilaire,
Constantine & Benjamin v. Trinidad & Tobago, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
94, paras. 12-20 (2002).
130 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trinidad & Tobago, Notice to Denounce the American
Convention of Human Rights (May 26, 1998); see also Press Release No. 10/98, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. (May 28, 1998) (expressing the view that Trinidad & Tobago's denunciation
represented "a serious step backwards in the hemispheric attempt to strengthen the inter-
American human rights system," but noting that Trinidad as a Member State of the OAS
would continue to be subject to the Commission's jurisdiction and be bound by the OAS
Charter, the American Declaration, and the Statute of the Commission).
At the same time, Trinidad, together with Jamaica, withdrew from the Optional Protocol
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serious legal and political consequences for the inter-American human rights system
of the domestic developments on the death penalty in the Caribbean region.
III. PROCESSING OF THE MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY COMPLAINTS
WITHIN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
The developments concerning the mandatory death penalty in the Common-
wealth Caribbean resulted in a series of individual cases and associated
precautionary measures before the Inter-American Commission against several
Caribbean Member States. In addition, the complaints filed against the Republic
of Trinidad and Tobago gave rise to proceedings before the Inter-American Court
involving both provisional measures and contentious cases, which ultimately
resulted in the Court's June 21, 2002 judgment in the consolidated case of
Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin.13 1
A. Processing of Cases Before the Inter-American Commission
The mandatory death penalty litigation in the Caribbean region significantly
impacted various aspects of the work of the inter-American human rights system.
As indicated above, the mandatory death penalty cases resulted in a dramatic
increase in the volume of petitions from that region, which rose to roughly ten
percent of the Commission's caseload by 2001.132 In addition, the complaints
raised legally and factually complicated issues, including the novel question of
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See Amnesty International, Death
Penalty News, AI Index: 53/003/1998 (June 1, 1998) (reporting that on May 26, 1998, the
Republic of Trinidad & Tobago similarly withdrew as a State Party to the Optional Protocol
to the ICCPR and on the same date notified the OAS Secretary General of its withdrawal as
a State Party to the American Convention, and that Jamaica had likewise previously
deposited an instrument with the U.N. Secretary General withdrawing as a State Party to the
Optional. Protocol to the ICCPR). While Trinidad & Tobago simultaneously re-acceded to
the Optional Protocol, it did so subject to a reservation that purported to preclude the
UNHRC from considering "communications from prisoners sentenced to death." Id. A
majority of the UNHRC subsequently determined this reservation to be invalid as contrary
to the object and purpose of the Optional Protocol. The Committee found that it sought to
exclude the application of the entire Covenant for one particular group of complainants,
namely prisoners under sentence of death, and thereby single out a certain group of
individuals for lesser procedural protection than the protection enjoyed by the rest of the
population. Therefore, the reservation constituted a discrimination that ran counter to some
of the most basic principles embodied in the Covenant and its Protocols. See Kennedy v.
Trinidad & Tobago, Case 845/1999, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/67/D/
845/1999, para. 6.7 (1999). Following this decision, Trinidad again denounced the Optional
Protocol on March 27, 2000 with effect from June 27, 2000.
13' Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94.
131 See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
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the compatibility of mandatory death sentences with international human rights
standards, as well as questions relating to pre-trial and post-conviction delay,
conditions of detention, and the adequacy of legal representation. The Commis-
sion's ability to respond to these developments was complicated by the part-time
status of its Members as well as its limited resources, and the situation was further
exacerbated by the pressure placed upon the Commission by Caribbean governments
to determine the petitions in accordance with the time periods prescribed in Pratt &
Morgan.
33
While the efforts by governments to compel the Commission to comply with
the terms of judgments of their domestic courts may have been misplaced as a
matter of international law,"M the Commission nevertheless acknowledged the
need to respond to the complaints expeditiously. Through a variety of initiatives,
the Commission succeeded in processing the significant volume of capital petitions
from the Caribbean region within a time period shorter than that envisioned in
Pratt & Morgan.
In particular, the Commission dedicated additional professional and adminis-
trative resources to processing the Caribbean capital petitions, and employed
several procedures aimed at minimizing the time required to decide the complaints.
For example, the Commission articulated and applied its doctrine on duplication, as
provided for in the American Convention and the Commission's Rules, 35 in
determining that nine capital petitions against Jamaica were inadmissible on the
basis that they had also been presented to the UNHRC.' 36 In addition, the
Commission prepared reports that joined individual petitions involving death row
inmates from the same state, on the premise that the petitions essentially raised
the same issues as contemplated in Article 40(2) of the Commission's former
133 See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
134 As the Inter-American Court observed in its order for provisional measures in James:
The function of the supervisory organs of the American
Convention is to ensure that the provisions of the American
Convention are observed and adequately applied by States in their
domestic laws, and not, as Trinidad and Tobago has argued, to ensure
that State Parties comply with their own domestic laws.
James v. Trinidad & Tobago, Order for Provisional Measures of Aug. 29, 1998, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. E) No. 2, para. 10 (1998).
13 See American Convention, supra note 10, at art. 46(l)(c) ("1. Admission by the
Commission of a petition or communication lodged in accordance with Articles 44 or 45
shall be subject to the following requirements: .. .c. that the subject of the petition or
communication is not pending in another international proceeding for settlement .... ).
136 See Blaine v. Jamaica, Case 11.827, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 96, OEA/ser. L./V.III. 102, doc.
6 rev. (1998); Lewis v. Attorney Gen. of Jamaica, [2000] 3 W.L.R. 1785, [2001] 2 A.C. 50
(P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.), available at http://www.privy-council.org.uk/
output/Pagel69.asp; Shaw v. Jamaica, Case 12.018, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 2/99, OEA/ser.
L./V.II.102, doc.6 rev (1999).
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Regulations, 37 and decided the admissibility and the merits of the petitions contem-
poraneously rather than in two separate stages as was the normal practice.'38
Through these procedural measures, between 1998 and 2002 the Commission
approved and published a total of forty-one admissibility and merits reports in
Caribbean death penalty cases. Also during this time, the Commission approved
three consolidated merits decisions in thirty-two mandatory death penalty cases
against the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, each of which was subsequently
referred to, litigated before, and decided upon by the Inter-American Court.
39
Moreover, through these efforts, the Commission succeeded in reducing the aver-
age time for processing non-commuted capital petitions, from the date the case is
opened to the date of the Commission's merits decision, from approximately twenty-
four months for cases opened in 1997 to fewer than twelve months for cases opened
in 1999.' 40
The Commission considered and determined a variety of issues in respect of
merits of the petitions and the complaints raised. These issues included the
mandatory nature of the death penalty, the fairness requirements for application
137 See, e.g., McKenzie v. Jamaica, Case 12.023, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, OEA/ser.
L.fV./II.106, doc. 6 (1999), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/99eng/merits/
jamaical2.023.htm (consolidation of five Jamaican cases involving six petitioners); Lamey
v. Jamaica, Case 11.826, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 49, OEA/ser. L./V.II. 11, doc. 20 rev. (2001)
(consolidation of four Jamaican cases involving four petitioners); Constantine v. Trinidad
& Tobago, Case 11.787, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 128 (unpublished 1999) (referred to the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights on Feb. 22, 2000) (consolidation of twenty-three Trinidad
& Tobago cases involving twenty-four petitioners); Benjamin v. Trinidad & Tobago, Case
12.148, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 53 (unpublished 2000) (referred to the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights on Oct. 5, 2000) (consolidation of seven Trinidad & Tobago cases involving
seven petitioners); Edwards v. The Bahamas, Case 12.067, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 48, OEA/ser.
L./V./I1.111, doc. 20 rev. (2001), available at http:llwww.cidh.org/annualrep/2000eng/
Chapterlll/Merits/Bahamasl2.067.htm (2000) (consolidation of three Bahamian cases
involving four petitioners).
138 See, e.g., Constantine, Case 11.787, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 128 (unpublished 1999).
... The forty-one reports adopted and published by the Commission between 1998 and
2002 in Caribbean death penalty cases included: one admissibility report in 1996; fourteen
admissibility reports, nine inadmissibility reports, and one merit report in 1998; four
admissibility reports, one published merit report, and one joint admissibility and merit report
in 1999; two merit reports and one joint admissibility and merit report in 2000; one
admissibility report and one joint admissibility report in 2001; and four admissibility reports
and two joint admissibility and merit reports in 2002. See 1998-2002 Annual Reports of the
Inter-Am. C.H.R., available at http://www.cidh.org.
,40 For example, according to calculations prepared by the Commission Secretariat, the
average processing time for non-commuted capital cases opened in 1997 for the states with
the greatest volume of cases was twenty-seven and one-half months for Jamaica and twenty-
three months for Trinidad & Tobago. These figures were reduced to, respectively, ten and
one-half months and fourteen months for cases opened in 1998, and, for cases opened in
1999, seven and one-half months for Jamaica and ten months for Trinidad & Tobago.
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of the Prerogative of Mercy, the right to trial within a reasonable time, the
treatment and conditions of detention, the fairness of the petitioners' criminal
proceedings, and the unavailability of legal assistance to pursue constitutional
motions before domestic courts.'
4
'
Cases raising issues of the nature described above were considered by the
Commission in connection with four Caribbean Member States: Trinidad and
Tobago,'42 Jamaica, 14 Grenada,'" and the Bahamas. 14' Although the Bahamas,
unlike the other three states, had not ratified the American Convention and there-
fore was subject only to the American Declaration, the Commission ultimately
interpreted the terms of the Convention and the Declaration in the same manner
in disposing of the various issues raised in the complaints. Among the most
significant findings rendered by the Commission were the following:
1. The mandatory nature of the death penalty under the
criminal law of the states concerned, whereby death is the
automatic penalty once a defendant is found guilty of murder
or, in the case of Jamaica, capital murder, resulted in the
arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 4(1) of the
Convention and Article I of the Declaration, constituted
inhumane treatment contrary to Articles 5(1) and 5(2) of the
Convention and Article XXVI of the Declaration, and violated
the right to a fair trial under Article 8(1) of the Convention
and Articles XVIII and XXVI of the Declaration, by failing to
permit consideration of the personal circumstances of an
individual offender in determining whether the death penalty
'41 At the same time, the Commission declined to address several ancillary issues raised
by certain petitioners, such as the permissibility of hanging as a form of execution, while
reserving its competence to address those matters in future cases. See, e.g., McKenzie, Case
12.023, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, paras. 239,269 (1999); Aitken v. Jamaica, Case 12.275, Inter-
Am. C.H.R. 58, OEA/ser L./V./II.117, doc. I rev. 1, para. 138 (2002) (reserving the
Commission's competence "to determine in an appropriate case in the future whether
hanging is a particularly cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment in comparison
with other methods of execution").
142 See, e.g., Constantine, Case 11.787, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 128 (unpublished 1999);
Benjamin, Case 12.148, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 53 (unpublished 2000).
113 See, e.g., McKenzie, Case 12.023, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, paras. 239,269 (1999); Lamey,
Case 11.826, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 49 (2001) (consolidation of four Jamaican cases involving
four petitioners).
" See, e.g., Baptiste v. Grenada, Case 11.743, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 38, OEA/ser.
L.N./I.106, doc. 6 rev. (2000); Knights v. Grenada, Case 12.028, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 47,
OEA/ser. L.V./II.1 11, doc. 20 rev. (2001).
4- See, e.g., Edwards, Case 12.067, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 48 (2001).
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is an appropriate punishment in the circumstances of his or her
case. 146
2. The process applied for giving effect to the prerogative
or mercy in the states concerned, by which a condemned
prisoner is afforded no legally-protected right to apply for
mercy, to submit supporting information, to receive material
submitted by the State, or to receive a timely decision, was
found not to provide condemned prisoners with an effective
right to seek amnesty, pardon or commutation of sentence and
is therefore incompatible with Article 4(6) of the Convention
and Article XXIV of the Declaration.'47
3. Many of the petitioners were found not to have been
tried within a reasonable time contrary to Articles 7(5) and 8(1)
of the Convention and Articles XVIII, XXV and XXVI of the
Declaration. In seventeen of the cases under consideration in
the Constantine v. Trinidad & Tobago matter, for example, the
pre-trial delays were in excess of two years and none of the
cases had been disposed of between arrest and final appeal in
less than four years, with some having taken more than eleven
years to be finally determined. Also in this connection, the
Commission found Trinidad and Tobago responsible for
violations of Articles 2 and 25 of the Convention, because the
right to be tried within a reasonable time is not provided for
under the Constitution or other domestic law of Trinidad and
Tobago. 141
4. Many of the petitioners in the states concerned were
found to have been subjected to treatment and conditions of
detention, both prior to their trials and following their convic-
tions, which failed to satisfy the standards of humane treatment
mandated by Article 5(1) and 5(2) of the American Convention
and Article XXVI of the Declaration.
49
14 See McKenzie, Case 12.023, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, paras. 198,203-06 (1999); Baptiste,
Case 11.743, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 38, paras. 85, 90-93 (2000); Edwards, Case 12.067, Inter-
Am. C.H.R. 48, paras. 141, 147-50 (2001).
147 See McKenzie, Case 12.023, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, paras. 228-32 (1999); Baptiste,
Case 11.743, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 38, paras. 85, 119-25 (2000); Edwards, Case 12.067, Inter-
Am. C.H.R. 48, paras. 168-74 (2001).
148 See McKenzie, Case 12.023, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, paras. 266-69 (1999); Edwards,
Case 12.067, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 48, paras. 218-25 (2001).
149 See McKenzie, Case 12.023, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, paras. 286-94 (1999); Baptiste,
Case 11.743, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 38, paras. 136-38 (2000); Edwards, Case 12.067, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. 48, paras. 195-98 (2001).
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5. Petitioners in several of the cases were found not to have
been afforded the right to a fair trial under Articles 8(1) and
8(2) of the Convention and Articles XVIII and XXVI of the
Declaration due to specific deficiencies in the criminal proceed-
ings against them, including, for example, improper delays in
permitting the defendant to contact an attorney following his
arrest. I
50
6. Those states that failed to make legal aid effectively
available to several victims to pursue Constitutional Motions in
the domestic courts in connection with their criminal proceed-
ings were found to be responsible for violations of the right to
a fair trial and the right to judicial protection embodied under
Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention and Articles XVIII and
XXVI of the Declaration.' 5'
Based upon these findings, the Commission recommended to the Member
States concerned, inter alia, that they grant the petitioners effective remedies,
including commutation of sentence and compensation, and adopt such legislative
or other measures as may be necessary to ensure that no person is sentenced to
death pursuant to a mandatory sentencing law.
Despite the Commission's requests in each of the cases for the Member States
concerned to inform it as to the measures taken to implement the Commission's
recommendations, no responses were forthcoming which would indicate that the
States had complied with the Commission's findings.'52 As a consequence, in most
instances the Commission decided to publish its decisions in accordance with
Article 51 of the Convention and the corresponding provisions of its Rules of
Procedure.'53 Concerning those cases against the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago,
however, which constituted the majority of mandatory death penalty petitions
before the Commission, one further option was available: to refer the cases to the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
5 4
"So See McKenzie, Case 12.023, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, paras. 298-306 (1999); Edwards,
Case 12.067, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 48, paras. 210-15 (2001).
,51 See McKenzie, Case 12.023, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, paras. 311-17 (1999); Baptiste,
Case 11.743, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 38, paras. 141-46 (2000); Edwards, Case 12.067, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. 48, paras. 201-07 (2001).
"' McKenzie, Case 12.023, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, paras. 318-21 (1999).
... Id. at paras. 332-33.
114 American Convention, supra note 10, at art. 5 1(1) (permitting the Commission or a
State Party that has accepted the Court's contentious jurisdiction to refer a case to the Court
within three months from the date the Commission's merits decision in the case is
transmitted to the state concerned in accordance with Article 50 of the Convention).
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B. Litigation Before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
From May 1991 until its denunciation of the Convention in 1998, Trinidad
and Tobago was the only state in the Commonwealth Caribbean to accept the
contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court.' 5 Accordingly, once the
Commission rendered admissibility and merits decisions in respect of the capital
petitions from Trinidad and Tobago, an opportunity opened to seek the Court's
views on the petitions' subject matter. Even prior to this point, however, the Court
played a role in preserving the petitioners' lives and personal integrity so as not
to hinder the processing of their cases before the Commission and the Court by
issuing provisional measures in favor of the condemned prisoners who had filed
complaints with the Commission.
1. Provisional Measures
Among the most urgent tasks faced by the Commission when it began
receiving capital petitions from the Caribbean region, as with those lodged from
other retentionist jurisdictions, was to ensure that the petitioners were not executed
before their complaints could be processed within the inter-American human rights
system. Accordingly, at the time of transmitting the pertinent parts of the petitions
to the Member State concerned, the Commission requested pursuant to Article 29
of the Commission's former Regulations, now Article 25 of the Commission's
Rules of Procedure,'56 that the Member State take the urgent measures necessary
to stay the petitioners' executions pending the Commission's investigation of their
complaints. 57 In all instances, however, the Member States failed to inform the
Commission of any steps they had taken to implement the Commission's requests.
With regard to complaints lodged against Trinidad and Tobago, the Commission
was empowered pursuant to Article 63(2) of the American Convention' to request
"5 See BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 59. Non-English-speaking states from the
Caribbean that have accepted the Court's contentious jurisdiction include Haiti, Suriname,
and the Dominican Republic. In June 2000, Barbados accepted the Court's contentious
jurisdiction. Id.
156 For the text of Article 25 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure, see supra note 76.
151 See, e.g., 1999-2001 Annual Reports of the Inter-Am. C.H.R., ch. III.C.l.
'58 Article 63(2) of the Convention provides:
In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to
avoid irreparable damage to persons, the Court shall adopt such
provisional measures as it deems pertinent in matters it has under
consideration. With respect to a case not yet submitted to the Court, it
may act at the request of the Commission.
Pursuant to this provision, the Court has developed a body of procedures and jurisprudence
in which it has requested that states take measures to address urgent situations involving
irreparable harm to persons. See Inter-Am. C.H.R., Provisional Measures - Compendium
(ser. E) Nos. 1-3 (1969).
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that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights issue binding orders for provi-
sional measures requiring Trinidad and Tobago to preserve the petitioners' lives
pending the outcome of their proceedings before the inter-American system. In the
absence of appropriate responses from Trinidad and Tobago to the Commission's
requests for precautionary measures, therefore, the Commission considered it
necessary and in the best interests of human rights to seek an order for provisional
measures from the Inter-American Court, even before the cases were procedurally
ripe to be referred to the Court.
Provisional measures were initially requested by the Commission and granted
by the Court in May 1998 in respect of five petitioners in five complaints,
Wenceslaus James, Anthony Briggs, Anderson Noel, Anthony Garcia, and
Christopher Bethel, which the Court consolidated as the James Case.15 9 Although
these complaints had not yet been submitted to the Inter-American Court, the
measures were requested pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Convention, which
explicitly authorizes the Court to grant provisional measures at the request of the
Commission "[w]ith respect to a case not yet submitted to the Court." 60 These
measures were requested by the Commission on May 22, 1998, granted by the
President of the Court on May 27, 1998, and affmned by the Court in plenary in an
order dated June 14, 1998, in which the Court also convened a hearing at its seat
in Costa Rica on August 28, 1998.161 One day following the hearing, the Court
issued an order affirming its earlier orders and amplifying the measures to include
the petitioners in three additional complaints, Darrin Roger Thomas, Haniff
Hilaire, and Denny Baptiste.'62 In each order, the Court included among its
considerations:
That the States Parties to the Convention should fully
comply in good faith (pacta sunt servanda) to all of the
provisions of the Convention, including those relative to the
operation of the two supervisory organs; and, that in view of
the Convention's fundamental objective of guaranteeing the
effective protection of human rights (Articles 1(1), 2, 51 and
63(2)), States Parties must refrain from taking actions that may
frustrate the restitutio in integrum of the rights of the alleged
victims."16
... James, Orders for Provisional Measures, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E) Nos. 1-3 (1998).
160 American Convention, supra note 10.
161 James, Order for Provisional Measures of June 14, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E)
No. 2 (1998).
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The Court continued: "[S]hould the State execute the alleged victims, it would
create an irreparable situation incompatible with the object and purpose of the
Convention, would amount to a disavowal of the authority of the Commission,
and would adversely affect the very essence of the Inter-American system."'1
64
Based in part upon these considerations, the Court ordered that Trinidad and
Tobago "take all measures necessary to preserve the life and physical integrity
of [the alleged victims] so as not to hinder the processing of their cases before
the Inter-American system."' 65 Consistent with its provisional measures practice,
the Court also provided for a reporting mechanism by which the State was
required to keep the Court apprised on a regular basis of the status of the measures'
beneficiaries. However, Trinidad and Tobago has consistently failed to observe
these conditions.66
Since these provisional measures were first issued, the Court has, at the
Commission's request, extended the measures on five occasions to encompass
thirty-five individuals in additional petitions lodged with the Commission. 167
The Court also rescinded the measures in respect of two of the beneficiaries,
Christopher Bethel and Anderson Noel, in September 2002 after Bethel pleaded
164 id.
165 id.
"6 See James, Order for Provisional Measures of Dec. 2, 2003, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
E) No. 4 (2003) (finding that Trinidad "has not complied with the duty established in Article
68(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights because it has not fulfilled the
obligation to report on the provisional measures ordered by the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights [in the James matter]").
167 See James, Order for Provisional Measures of Aug. 29, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
E) No. 2 (1998) (extending measures to Darin Roger Thomas, Haniff Hilaire, and Denny
Baptiste); James, Order for Provisional Measures of May 25, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
E) No. 2 (1999) (extending measures to twenty victims in nineteen cases - Wilberforce
Bernard, Naresh Boodram and Joey Ramiah, Clarence Charles, Philip Chotolal, George
Constantine, Rodney Davis, Natasha De Leon, Mervyn Edmund, Alfred Frederick, Nigel
Mark, Wayne Matthews, Steve Mungroo, Vijay Mungroo, Wilson Prince, Martin Reid, Noel
Seepersad, Gangaleen Tahaloo, Keiron Thomas, and Samuel Winchester); James, Order for
Provisional Measures of May 27, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E) No. 2 (1999) (extending
measures to include an additional eight victims in seven cases before the Commission -
Anthony Johnson, Kevin Dial and Andrew Dottin, Peter Benjamin, Krishandath Seepersad,
Allan Phillip, Narine Sooklal and Amir Mowlah); James, Order for Provisional Measures of
Sept. 25, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E) No. 2 (1999) (extending measures to cover two
additional alleged victims in two cases before the Commission - Mervyn Parris and Francis
Mansingh); James, Order for Provisional Measures of Nov. 26, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. E) No. 2 (2001) (extending the measures to cover five alleged victims in five additional
cases before the Commission - Balkissoon Roodal, Sheldon Roach, Arnold Ramlogan,
Beemal Ramnarace and Takoor Ramcharan).
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guilty to manslaughter and Noel was retried and found guilty of manslaughter.
Both men were sentenced to five years imprisonment.1
68
2. Referral of Cases to the Inter-American Court
In addition to requesting provisional measures from the Inter-American Court,
the Commission decided to refer most of the cases against Trinidad and Tobago to
the Inter-American Court pursuant to Articles 50 and 61(1) of the American
Convention, following the Commission's determination of the admissibility and
merits of the matters.169 The Commission's decision to refer all matters to the
Court was influenced by several factors, including in particular developments in
the case of Anthony Briggs.
Mr. Briggs was among the first condemned prisoners in Trinidad and Tobago
to file a petition with the Commission. The Commission processed his complaint
by determining the admissibility and merits of the petition and, as provided for
under Article 51 of the Convention, publishing its decision rather than referring
the matter to the Inter-American Court."0 In its report, the Commission found the
State responsible for violations of Mr. Briggs's right to a speedy trial under Article
7(5) of the Convention and recommended commutation of his sentence.' Rather
than implementing the Commission's recommendation, Trinidad and Tobago moved
before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to lift the stay of execution
flowing from the Thomas & Hilaire judgment. Trinidad and Tobago also moved
before the Inter-American Court to lift its provisional measures in Mr. Briggs's case
on the ground that the process before the inter-American system was completed
and, therefore, the grounds for the stay and provisional measures ceased to subsist.
In response to Trinidad's request, the Inter-American Court issued an order on
May 25, 1999, maintaining the measures "until such time as the Court, having
previously considered the reports concerning the present status of his case, issues
168 See James, Order for Provisional Measures of Sept. 3, 2002, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
E) No. 4 (2002).
169 Two of the complaints that remain the subject of the Court's provisional measures in
the James cases, Anthony Johnson (Petition P11.718) and co-petitioners Kevin Dial and
Andrew Dottin (Petition P12.145), have not been referred to the Court, owing to
extraordinary domestic procedures that have been pursued by the alleged victims after filing
their petitions with the Commission. See James, Order for Provisional Measures of Nov. 24,
2000, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E) No. 4 (2000) (requesting that the State submit information
concerning the proceedings of Anthony Johnson, Kevin Dial, and Andrew Dottin before the
domestic courts).
0 Briggs v. Trinidad & Tobago, Case 11.815, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 44, OEA/ser.
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a decision on this matter." '172 Notwithstanding the Inter-American Court's
determination, however, on July 22, 1999, the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council decided to lift the stay of Mr. Briggs's execution, based upon its own
interpretation of the American Convention and its conclusion that the processes
before the inter-American system had, in fact, been spent.'73 On July 28, 1999,
Trinidad executed Mr. Briggs.' 74
This series of regrettable events demonstrated that Trinidad and Tobago would
not respect the Commission's decisions or implement its recommendations in
death penalty cases. It was therefore apparent that to effectively preserve and
protect the human rights of the alleged victims pending the outcome of the litigation
before the inter-American system, all of the capital cases from Trinidad and Tobago
would have to be referred to the Court. Only through this strategy could the
Commission ensure each petitioner the direct benefit of a binding and final judgment
of the Inter-American Court on the issues he or she had presented to the inter-
American system.
Accordingly, by way of three separate applications, the Commission referred
thirty-one cases involving thirty-two petitioners to the Inter-American Court
following the adoption by the Commission of admissibility and preliminary merits
decisions on the matters. 17 On May 25, 1999, the day prior to the effective date
of Trinidad and Tobago's denunciation, the Commission referred the case of
Haniff Hilaire. Subsequently, in an application dated February 22, 2000, in the
case of George Constantine, the Commission referred to the Inter-American Court
twenty-three consolidated cases involving twenty-four petitioners.'76 In a further
172 James, Order for Provisional Measures of May 25, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E)
No. 2 (1999).
' See Briggs v. Baptiste, [2000] 2 W.L.R. 574, [2000] 2 A.C. 40 (P.C. 1999) (appeal
taken from Trin. & Tobago), available at http://www.privy-council.org.uk/output/
Pagel70.asp.
17 World: Americas Trinidad Hangs Killer, BBC NEWS, July 28, 1999,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilamericas/405494.stm (last visited Dec. 11, 2004).
17' Hilaire v. Trinidad & Tobago, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 66 (unpublished 1999),
available at http:www.oas.org; Constantine v. Trinidad & Tobago, Case 11.787, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. 128 (unpublished 1999) (referred to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on
Feb. 22, 2000); Benjamin v. Trinidad & Tobago, Case 12.148, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 53
(unpublished 2000) (referred to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on Oct. 5, 2000).
176 The twenty-four petitioners in the Constantine case were: George Constantine,
Wenceslaus James, Denny Baptiste, Clarence Charles, Keiron Thomas, Anthony Garcia,
Wilson Prince, Darrin Roger Thomas, Mervyn Edmund, Samuel Winchester, Martin Reid,
Rodney Davis, Gangadeen Tahaloo, Noel Seepersad, Wayne Matthews, Alfred Fredrick,
Natasha De Leon, Vijay Mungroo, Phillip Chotalal, Naresh Boodram, Joey Ramiah, Nigel
Mark, Wilberforce Bernard, and Steve Mungroo. Constantine v. Trinidad & Tobago, Case




application dated October 5, 2000, in the case of Peter Benjamin, the Commission
referred an additional seven consolidated cases involving seven petitioners to the
Court.,
Once these applications were filed with the Court, each was the subject of two
principal phases: preliminary objections raised by Trinidad and Tobago concerning
the Court's jurisdiction to entertain the cases; and, following the dismissal of the
State's objections, a consolidated judgment on merits and reparations.' 78
a. Preliminary Objections to the Inter-American Court's Jurisdiction
In all three applications, Trinidad and Tobago raised preliminary objections
before the Inter-American Court, arguing that the Court lacked the jurisdiction to
hear the matters. Trinidad's objections primarily relied upon the "reservation" it
purported to have taken when ratifying the American Convention and accepting the
contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court on May 22, 1991. This
qualification, which appeared in Trinidad and Tobago's May 1991 instrument of
ratification, read as follows:
As regards Article 62 of the Convention, the Government
of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago recognizes the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
as stated in said article only to such extent that recognition is
consistent with the relevant sections of the Constitution of the
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, and provided that any
judgment of the Court does not infringe, create or abolish any
existing rights or duties of any private citizen.
79
In its objections, Trinidad and Tobago asserted that this reservation was
compatible with the object and purpose of the American Convention, on the basis
that Article 62 of the Convention' is a provision that states are free to accept or
'7' The seven victims in the Benjamin case were: Peter Benjamin, Krishendath Seepersad,
Allan Phillip, Narine Sooklal, Amir Mowlah, Mervyn Parris, and Francis Mansingh.
Benjamin v. Trinidad & Tobago, Case12.148, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (set. C) No. 81 (2001),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecpdfingl seriec_81_ing.pdf.
178 Id.
179 BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 72.
'go See American Convention, supra note 10, at art. 62. Article 62 of the American
Convention, which prescribes the terms by which states parties may accept the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction, reads as follows:
1. A State Party may, upon depositing its instrument of ratification
or adherence to this Convention, or at any subsequent time, declare that
it recognizes as binding, ipso facto, and not requiring specific
agreement, the jurisdiction of the Court on all matters relating to the
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reject and, if they do accept, the acceptance can be subject to conditions. 8 1
Alternatively, Trinidad argued that if its reservation was found to be incompatible
with the Convention's terms, the State should be found not to have accepted the
Court's jurisdiction in the first place. 1 2
The Commission opposed the preliminary objection on two main grounds.
First, the Commission argued that the "reservation" under consideration was,
properly construed, a declaration of certain conditions that the State endeavored
to place on its acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, and that these
conditions were invalid as beyond the parameters of permissible conditions under
Article 62 of the American Convention. Second, the Commission contended that
the "reservation" was inconsistent with the object and purpose of the American
Convention, and should be severed from the State's declaration of acceptance.'83
Following an August 10, 2000, hearing on the preliminary objections in
Hilaire in which both the State and the Commission participated, the Inter-
American Court rejected Trinidad and Tobago's preliminary objections in their
totality in three unanimous judgments issued on September 1, 2001.'14 On the
objections relating to the terms of Trinidad and Tobago's acceptance of the
Court's compulsory jurisdiction in particular, the Court concluded that the limi-
tation placed upon Trinidad and Tobago's acceptance of the Court's compulsory
interpretation and application of this Convention.
2. Such declaration may be made unconditionally, on the condition
of reciprocity, for a specified period, or for specific cases. It shall be
presented to the Secretary General of the Organization, who shall
transmit copies thereof to the other member states of the Organization
and to the Secretary of the Court.
3. Thejurisdiction of the Court shall comprise all cases concerning
the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Convention
that are submitted to it, provided that the States Parties to the case
recognize or have recognized such jurisdiction, whether by special
declaration pursuant to the preceding paragraphs, or by a special
agreement.
Id.
'8 The Court summarized the positions of the State and the Commission in its judgments
on the preliminary objections in the three cases rendered on September 1, 2001. See Hilaire,
Case 11.816, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 80; Benjamin, Case 12.148, Inter-Am Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 81; Constantine, Case 11.787, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 82.
12 Hilaire, Case 11.816, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 80, para. 52; Benjamin, Case
12.148, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 81, para. 51; Constantine, Case 11.787, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 82, para. 5 1.
' Hilaire, Case 11.816, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 80, paras. 53-59; Benjamin, Case
12.148, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 81, paras. 52-58; Constantine, Case 11.787, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 82, para. 52-58.
"8 Hilaire, Case 11.816, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 80, para. 90, oper. para. 1;
Benjamin, Case 12.148, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 81, para. 90, oper. para. 1;
Constantine, Case 11.787, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 82, para. 90, oper. para. 1.
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jurisdiction was incompatible with the Convention's object and purpose. The Court
found that the instrument of acceptance was:
not consistent with the hypothesis stipulated in Article 62(2) of
the American Convention. It is general in scope, which com-
pletely subordinates the application of the American Convention
to the internal legislation of Trinidad and Tobago as decided by
its courts. This implies that the instrument of acceptance is
manifestly incompatible with the object and purpose of the
Convention. As a result, the said article does not contain a
provision that allows Trinidad and Tobago to formulate the
"restriction" it made. 185
In reaching this conclusion, the Inter-American Court reiterated its views as
to the exceptional nature of human rights treaties, stating that the American
Convention and other human rights treaties are:
inspired by a set of higher common values (centered around the
protection of the human being), are endowed with specific
supervisory mechanisms, are applied as a collective guarantee,
embody essentially objective obligations, and have a special
character that sets them apart from other treaties. The latter
govern mutual interests between and among the States parties
and are applied by them, with all the juridical consequences that
follow there from for the international and domestic systems. 86
Insofar as Trinidad relied upon the jurisprudence of the International Court of
Justice regarding permissible restrictions to that Court's jurisdiction, the Inter-
American Court also reiterated its view, initially expressed in its judgments on
competence in Constitutional Court87 and Ivcher Bronstein'88 that:
No analogy can be drawn between the State practice
detailed under Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International
18 Hilaire, Case 11.816, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 80, para. 88; Benjamin, Case
12.148, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 81, para. 79; Constantine, Case 11.787, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 82, para. 79.
186 Hilaire, Case 11.816, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 80, para. 94; Benjamin, Case
12.148, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 81, para. 85; Constantine, Case 11.787, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 82, para. 85.
187 Constitutional Court v. Peru, Case 11.760, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 71 (2001),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecpdf-ing/seriec-77_ing.pdf.
188 Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Case 11.762, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74 (2001),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecpdf.ing/seriec_74_ing.pdf.
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Court of Justice and acceptance of the optional clause concern-
ing recognition of the binding jurisdiction of this Court, given
the particular nature and the object and purpose of the American
Convention.'89
Finally, the Court appeared to reject Trinidad's contention that a finding of
incompatibility between its declaration and Article 62 of the Convention necessarily
leads to the conclusion that Trinidad never accepted the Court's jurisdiction from
the outset. The Court reasoned that:
it would be meaningless to suppose that a State which had freely
decided to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court had
decided at the same time to restrict the exercise of its functions
as foreseen in the Convention. On the contrary, the mere
acceptance by the State leads to the overwhelming presumption
that the State will subject itself to the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court."9
With the issuance of these judgments rejecting Trinidad and Tobago's preliminary
objections, the three cases moved to the merits and reparations phases of the Court's
process.
b. Hearing and Judgment on the Merits
In an order issued on November 30, 2001, the Inter-American Court joined
the three applications pursuant to Article 28 of its Rules of Procedure, and
convened a hearing on the merits and reparations of the consolidated applications
on February 20 and 21, 2002.' On February 8, 2002, Trinidad and Tobago
transmitted a note to the Court announcing that it would not attend the public
hearing convened by the Court, apparently based upon the same preliminary
objections that the Court had already rejected. The State's note read:
1' Hilaire, Case 11.816, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 80, para. 97 (quoting
Constitutional Court, Case 11.760, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 55, para. 46 (1999)
(alteration in original), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecpdfingseriec-55
_ing.pdf; Ivcher Bronstein, Case 11.762, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 54, para. 47
(alteration in original), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecpdf-ingseriec_54
_ing.pdf.
1 o Hilaire, Case 11.816, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 80, para 90.
"'m Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin v. Trinidad & Tobago, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 94, para. 43 (2002) (noting the joining of the three cases by an order dated
November 30, 2001), available athttp://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecpdf-ingseriec_94_ing.pdf.
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The Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago
must decline the invitation of the Court to participate at the
public hearing and the preliminary meeting to be held on 20-21
February, 2002 [... I In taking this decision the Government of
Trinidad and Tobago does not intend any discourtesy towards
the Court or its distinguished and learned President. It reflects
the belief of the State that, in the absence of any special agree-
ment by the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago recognizing the
jurisdiction of the Court in this matter, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights has no jurisdiction in respect of these
cases. 1
92
In its final judgment in the matter, the Court indicated that it did not agree with
the reason given by the State for not appearing before the Court and for not
participating in the proceedings, citing the fundamental axiom compftence de la
competence/Kompetenz-Kompetez - that the Court has the inherent authority to
determine the scope of its own jurisdiction.'93
The merits hearing in the cases nevertheless proceeded with the representatives
of the petitioners and the Commission in attendance. During the course of the
hearing, the Commission, with the extensive participation and assistance of the
petitioners' representatives, called three witnesses.'94 Desmond Allum, an attorney
from Trinidad and Tobago, testified concerning pertinent domestic criminal law and
the nature of legal representation available in Trinidad and Tobago.'95 Another
Trinidadian attorney, Gaietry Pargass, gave evidence concerning prison conditions
in Trinidad and Tobago and the experience of prisoners on death row in that state.'96
Finally, Nigel Eastman, a noted psychiatrist from the United Kingdom, provided
expert evidence as to the mental condition of one of the prisoners, Amir Mowlah.197
The testimony of these witnesses was supplemented by expert reports prepared by
each of them and filed with the Court prior to the hearing, together with three
192 Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94,
para. 16 (citing Note from the Attorney General of the Republic of Trinidad & Tobago to the
Secretary of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Feb. 8, 2002) (alteration in
original)).
Id. at para. 17.
194 During the merits hearing before the Court, the petitioners were represented by British
attorneys Julian Knowles, Keir Starmer, Yasmin WaIjee, Parvais Jabber, and Julie Morris.
The Commission was represented by Commissioner and Rapporteur for Trinidad & Tobago
Professor Robert K. Goldman, British Barrister Nicholas Blake QC, and this author as legal
adviser.
'95 Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94,
para. 77(a).
196 Id. at para. 77(c).
117 Id. at para. 77(b).
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additional expert reports: one prepared by Thomas Alfred Warlow, a ballistics
expert, concerning ballistics evidence in the case of Peter Benjamin; another by
Baroness Vivian Stem, Honorary Secretary General of Penal Reform International
and Honorary Fellow of the London School of Economics, and Andrew Coyle, a
criminologist with twenty-five years' experience at a senior level in the prison
services of the United Kingdom, concerning prison conditions in Trinidad and
Tobago; and a third by Scharlette Holdman, a U.S. mitigation expert, concerning
the use of mitigating evidence in capital proceedings in the United States.'
Based upon this evidence and the oral and written representations made by
the Commission and the petitioners' representatives during and after the hearing,
the Court issued its judgment on merits and reparations in Hilaire, Constantine &
Benjamin on June 21, 2002.'" In its main judgment, which ran to over 100 pages
and was accompanied by three separate concurring opinions, the Court made
several key findings concerning six substantive areas in addition to reparations:
the mandatory death penalty, the right to trial within a reasonable time; the right
to a fair trial and judicial protection; detention conditions; amnesty, pardon, or
commutation of sentence; and non-compliance with provisional measures ordered
by the Court in the case of prisoner Joey Ramiah."2
i. Mandatory Death Penalty
The Court concluded that the State violated the right to life under Articles 4(1)
and 4(2) in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the American Convention, as well as its
obligations under Article 2 of the Convention, to the detriment of each of the
condemned prisoners, because of the mandatory nature of the death penalty under
Trinidad's Offenses Against the Person Act of 1925."01 In particular, the Court
found that the pertinent provisions of Trinidad and Tobago's Offenses Against the
Person Act had two elements:
a) in the determination of criminal responsibility, [the law]
only authorize[d] the competent judicial authority to find a
person guilty of murder solely based on the categorization of the
crime, without taking into account the personal conditions of the
defendant or the individual circumstances of the crime; and
19' Id. at para. 76 (a summary of the evidence presented to the Court can be found at paras.
61-83 of the Court's June 21, 2002 judgment).
'99 Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94.
Id. at 1-2.
"' Id. at paras. 109, 118 (In particular, § 4 of the Offenses Against the Person Act renders
the death penalty the required punishment for murder, providing that, "[e]very person




b) in the determination of punishment, it mechanically
and generically impose[d] the death penalty for all persons
found guilty of murder and prevent[ed] the modification of the
punishment through a process of judicial review.2"
In finding that the Act contravened Article 4(1) and 4(2) of the American
Convention, the Court noted that it "automatically and generically mandates the
application of the death penalty for murder and disregards the fact that murder
may have varying degrees of seriousness."2"3 The Court also noted that the law
"prevent[ed] the judge from considering the basic circumstances in establishing the
degree of culpability and individualising the sentence. ' ' 204
Although the Commission did not find in its Article 50 reports or allege before
the Court violations of Article 4(2) of the Convention2 ' in relation to the manda-
tory death penalty issue, the Court decided to examine this provision iura novit
curia, and found the State responsible for violations of this article. 206 Specifically,
the Court found that the Offenses Against the Person Act punished by death
"crimes that do not exhibit characteristics of utmost seriousness" contrary to
Article 4(2) of the Convention so as also to be arbitrary under Article 4(1) of the
Convention.20 7 This was in contrast to the Commission's approach to the issue,
which declined to conclude that murder might in some circumstances not constitute
a "most serious" crime within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the Convention.
Rather, the Commission found that the law was per se "arbitrary" within the
meaning of Article 4(1) of the Convention20 8 because it applied the death penalty
automatically and generically in all cases of murder notwithstanding that the crime
202 Id. at para. 104.
203 Id. at para. 103.
204 id.
205 Article 4(2) of the American Convention provides:
In countries that have not abolished the death penalty, it may be
imposed only for the most serious crimes and pursuant to a final
judgment rendered by a competent court and in accordance with a law
establishing such punishment, enacted prior to the commission of the
crime. The application of such punishment shall not be extended to
crimes to which it does not presently apply.
American Convention, supra note 10, at art. 4(2).
206 Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94,
paras. 106-09.
207 Id. at para. 106.
208 Under Article 4(1) of the American Convention, "[elvery person has the right to have
his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of
conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." American Convention, supra
note 10, at art. 4(1).
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can be committed in a wide variety of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 9
The Commission also considered the penalty to violate the right to humane
treatment and the right to a fair trial under Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention. 1 ° In
its judgment, however, the Court did not address these provisions in the context
of the mandatory death penalty issue.
With respect to Article 2 of the Convention concerning "domestic legal
effects, '2 1 l the Court confirmed that the requirement that states bring their domestic
law into compliance with the terms of the Convention in order to guarantee the
rights set out therein also obliges states to refrain "from promulgating laws that
disregard or impede the free exercise of [those] rights."212  Further, citing its
judgments in Sudrez-Rosero21 3 and Barrios Altos,2"4 the Court opined that a legis-
lative act of a state can constitute a per se violation of the American Convention." 5
In particular, the Court considered that:
[E]ven though thirty-one of the alleged victims in this case
have not yet been executed, it is appropriate to consider that
there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention, by
virtue of the fact that the mere existence of the Offenses Against
the Person Act in itself constitutes a per se violation of that
209 See, e.g., McKenzie v. Jamaica, Case 12.023, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, OEA/Ser.
L./VIlI. 106, doc. 6, para. 198 (1999), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/99eng/
merits/jamaical 2.023.htm; Baptiste v. Grenada, Case 11.743, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 38, OEA/ser.
L./V.II. 106, doc. 6 rev., para. 85 (2000); Edwards v. The Bahamas, Case 12.067, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. 48, OEA/ser. L.N.III.1 11, doc. 20 rev., para. 141 (2001), available at http://www.
cidh.org/annualrep/2000eng/ChapterlIl/Merits/Bahamasl 2.067.htm.
210 See, e.g., McKenzie, Case 12.023, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, paras. 203-06 (1999);
Baptiste, Case 11.743, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 38, paras. 90-93 (2000); Edwards, Case 12.067,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 48, paras. 147-50 (2001).
21 Article 2 of the American Convention provides:
Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in
Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the
States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their
constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such
legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to
those rights or freedoms.
American Convention, supra note 10, at art. 2.
212 Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94,
para. 113.
213 Sudrez-Rosero v. Ecuador, Case 11.273, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 35 (1997),
available at http://www.coretidh.or.cr/sereicpdf ing/sereic_35_ing.pdf.
214 Barrios Altos v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75 (2001), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecpdf ing/seriec_75_ing.pdf.




provision of the Convention. This assertion is consistent with
Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, which states that, "[iln the case of
self-executing laws, [ ... ] the violation of human rights, whether
individual or collective, occurs upon their promulgation."2 6
ii. Right to Trial Within a Reasonable Time, and Right to a Fair Trial and
Judicial Protection
The second principal finding by the Inter-American Court on the merits of
Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin was the State's responsibility for violating the
right to trial within a reasonable time under Articles 7(5) and 8(1) in conjunction
with Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention, to the detriment of thirty of the
petitioners. The Court, in addition, found the State violated the right to effective
recourse established in Articles 8 and 25 in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the
Convention, to the detriment of eleven of the petitioners.1 7
In particular, the Court relied upon its prior jurisprudence according to which
three factors are considered in determining the reasonableness of the time within
which a proceeding must take place in accordance with Article 7(5) and 8(1) of
the Convention: the complexity of the case, the procedural activity of the inter-
ested party, and the conduct of the judicial authorities. 2 8 The Court also indicated
that "in certain cases a prolonged delay in itself can constitute a violation of the
right to a fair trial" and that in these situations "the State must provide, according
to the above criteria, . .. an explanation and proof as to why it has needed more
time than normally required to issue a final judgment in a particular case. 2 19 On
the facts of the cases at issue, the Court noted that the total delays between arrest
and final appeal experienced by thirty of the prisoners, as disclosed by the record,
ranged from four years to eleven years and nine months 220 and recalled that in its
judgment in Sutrez-Rosero22' the Court had concluded that a delay of four years
and two months between arrest and final appeal "far exceed[ed]" the time con-
216 Id. at para. 116 (citing Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, supra note 80, at para. 43) (latter
two alterations in original) (citation omitted).
217 Id. at paras. 119-52.
218 Id. at paras. 143-44.
219 Id. at para. 145.
220 Id. at para. 84 n.98 (pertaining to petitioners Haniff Hilaire, George Constantine,
Wenceslaus James, Denny Baptiste, Clarence Charles, Keiron Thomas, Wilson Prince,
Darrin Roger Thomas, Mervyn Edmund, Martin Reid, Rodney Davis, Gangadeen Tahaloo,
Noel Seepersad, Wayne Matthews, Alfred Frederick, Natasha de Leon, Vijay Mungroo,
Philip Chotalal, Naresh Boodram, Joey Ramiah, Nigel Mark, Wilberforce Bernard, Steve
Mungroo, Peter Benjamin, Krishendath Seepersad, Allan Phillip, Narine Sooklal, Amir
Mowlah, Mervyn Parris, and Francis Mansingh).
22, Sudrez-Rosero, Case 11.273, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 35.
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templated under the Convention.222 Moreover, the Court concluded that "Trinidad
and Tobago's domestic law [did] not [recognize] the right to a trial within a
reasonable time and therefore, [did] not conform to the dictates of the
Convention."22 3 Under these circumstances, therefore, the Court found Trinidad
responsible for violations of Articles 7(5) and 8(1) in conjunction with Articles 1 (1)
and 2 of the Convention, in respect of the thirty prisoners.224
Regarding the allegations concerning the right to judicial protection and the
petitioners' lack of access to "constitutional motions" - the procedure by which
constitutional challenges may be raised before the courts in Trinidad and Tobago
225
- the Court found in respect of eleven of the prisoners that they had been denied
access to legal aid to pursue constitutional motions, that the filing of such motions
was complicated and difficult without the assistance of an attorney, and, therefore,
that in practice "there is no effective means to present constitutional motions in
Trinidad and Tobago. '226 On this basis, the Court concluded that the State was
responsible for violating the rights of these prisoners under Articles 8 and 25 in
conjunction with Article 1(1) of the Convention.227
Although the Commission had alleged specific violations of Article 8 in respect
of the manner in which the trial or appeal proceedings of four of the victims were
conducted,2 8 the Court declined to analyze these specific allegations, but rather
held that these violations were "included within the broad nature of the violations
already found of the American Convention." 2" As the Court ultimately ordered
the State to re-try all of the petitioners based upon the application of the flawed
Offenses Against the Person Act,230 the precise nature of the due process vio-
lations experienced by each individual appears to have had little practical effect on
the outcome of the case.
222 Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94,
para. 144.
223 Id. at para. 152(a) (finding that "[tihe Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and
Tobago does not stipulate trial within a reasonable time as part of due process guarantees");
see also id. at para. 84(k).
22 Id. at para. 152(a).
225 See TRIN. & TOBAGO CONST. § 14(1).
226 Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94,
para. 149 (pertaining to the petitioners George Constantine, Wilson Prince, Mervyn Edmund,
Martin Reid, Gangadeen Tahaloo, Noel Seepersad, Natasha De Leon, Phillip Chotolal,
Wilberforce Bernard, Amir Mowlah and Mervyn Parris); see also id. at para. 152(b).
227 Id. at para. 152(b).
228 For example, with respect to Peter Benjamin, Case 12.148, the Commission argued,
based upon the record in his case, that the weapon allegedly used by Benjamin to commit the
murder was a sixteen-gauge gun, while the weapon used to kill the murder victim was
actually a twelve-gauge gun, and, therefore, that Benjamin could not have committed the
murder. Id. at para. 131.
229 Id. at para. 152(d).




In its judgment, the Court also analyzed evidence presented concerning
detention conditions, in light of its prior decisions on the issue as well as those
of other international human rights bodies, 23 ' and made the following factual
findings:
All of the victims' pre and post trial detention took place in
grossly overpopulated and unhygienic conditions. As to pre-
trial detention conditions, their cells, referred to as "F2" cells,
lack sufficient ventilation and natural light. Along with the
showers used by the victims, they are located in close proximity
to the execution chamber (gallows). The prisoners do not have
adequate nutrition, medical services or recreation, which only
exacerbates the state of mental anguish in which they live.
The detention conditions described above only exacerbate
the intrinsic suffering that the alleged victims already endure
due to the impending imposition of their death penalty .232
In finding that the conditions of all thirty-two victims constituted cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment contravening Articles 5(1) and 5(2) of the
Convention,233 the Court held that the consolidated evidence before it was "in
fact indicative of the general conditions in Trinidad and Tobago's prison system,
and as such, constituted a violation of Article 5 to the detriment of all victims." 34
As in the case of the fair trial allegations, the Commission had alleged specific
violations of other Article 5 provisions of the Convention in respect of two of the
victims,235 but the Court declined to pronounce upon these allegations for the
231 Id. at paras. 153-72 (citing, inter alia, Judgment, Cantoral Benavides case, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. (Aug. 18, 2000) (ser. C) (No. 69), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cs
seriecpdfing/seriec_69_ing.pdf; Moriana Hernndez Valentini de Bazzano v. Uruguay, No.
5/1977, U.N.H.R. Comm. (Aug. 15, 1979); Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1989).
232 Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94,
paras. 84(m), (o) (internal citation omitted).
233 Id. at para. 169.
234 Id. at para. 170.
235 For example, the Commission argued that the State did not make any attempt to reform
or socially readapt Haniff Hilaire (Case 11.816) or Krishendath Seepersad (Case 12.149) in
accordance with Article 5(6) of the Convention, for example by teaching them to read or
write or giving them training on violence prevention and control. The Commission contended
that for persons sentenced to death, the possibility of the death sentence being revoked or
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reason that they were "encompassed by the broad nature of those [violations]
already found in the present Judgment. '236
iv. Amnesty, Pardon, or Commutation of Sentence
Also included in the Court's judgment was a finding of State responsibility
for violations of Article 4(6) in conjunction with Articles 8 and 1(1) of the
Convention, to the detriment of all thirty-two victims.2 37  Article 4(6) of the
Convention provides that "[elvery person condemned to death shall have the right
to apply for amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence, which may be granted
in all cases. Capital punishment shall not be imposed while such a petition is
pending decision by the competent authority. 238
In particular, the Court concluded that individual mercy petitions must be
exercised through "fair and adequate procedures in conformity with Article 4(6) of
the Convention and in conjunction with relevant due process guarantees established
in Article 8," the latter of which the Court considered were necessary to make the
right under Article 4(6) effective. 239 The Court went on to find that the State was
obliged to "implement a fair and transparent procedure by which an offender
sentenced to death may make use of all favorable evidence deemed relevant to
the granting of mercy. '240 In so concluding, the Court appears to have accepted
the Commission's submission that, under the processes in place in Trinidad and
Tobago, the petitioners had no meaningful opportunity to present mercy petitions
or to have them considered by the competent authorities. 24 '
commuted continues until all appeals have been exhausted. Therefore, during this time period
there should be no discrimination in providing opportunities for reform or social re-
adaptation "based solely on the fact that these prisoners were sentenced to death." Id. at para.
158.
236 Id. atpara. 171.
237 Id. at paras. 173-89.
238 American Convention, supra note 10, at art. 4(6).
239 Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94,
para. 186.
240 Id. at para. 188.
24i In paragraph 84(h) and (i) of its Judgment, the Court noted the procedure for obtaining
a pardon:
In accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad
and Tobago, the President of the Republic retains a discretionary power
to pardon those sentenced to death.
The Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago provides
for an Advisory Committee on the Power of Pardon, which is charged
with considering and making recommendations to the relevant Minister
as to whether an offender sentenced to death should benefit from
discretionary pardon.
Id. at para. 84(h), (i) (citation omitted).
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v. Non-Compliance with Provisional Measures in the Case of Joey Ramiah
In the course of the merits proceedings before the Court, only one of the
prisoners, Joey Ramiah, was executed. This occurred notwithstanding the fact that
Mr. Ramiah was among the beneficiaries of the Court's provisional measures in
James and that his case had been referred to the Court as part of the Constantine
Application.24 2 In this respect, the Court rejected the State's contention that it was
not aware of the Court's provisional measures order, and found that Trinidad and
Tobago arbitrarily deprived Mr. Ramiah of his right to life in violation of Article 4
of the Convention by executing him on June 4, 1999, pursuant to a death sentence
imposed under the Offenses Against the Persons Act.243 The Court also found
that the arbitrary deprivation of Mr. Ramiah's life was "aggravated" because it
occurred despite the existence of provisional measures ordered by the Court in
his favor while his case was pending before the inter-American system. 2"
vi. Reparations
The reparations ordered by the Court were comprised of several elements,
including reforms to Trinidad and Tobago's laws and prison system, the retrial
of all petitioners who remained on death row, and the payment of monetary
reparations to the next of kin of Mr. Ramiah and of expenses to the prisoners'
representatives.245
Concerning the mandatory nature of the death penalty under Trinidad's law,
the Court ordered the State to abstain from applying the Offenses Against the
Person Act of 1925 and, within a reasonable period of time, to modify the Act to
comply with international norms of human rights protections. According to the
Court:
The legislative reforms contemplated should include the
introduction of different categories (criminal classes) of
murder, in keeping with the wide range of differences in the
gravity of the act, so as to take into account the particular
circumstances of both the crime and the offender. A system of
graduated levels should be introduced to ensure that the
242 Constantine v. Trinidad & Tobago, Case 11.787, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 82
(2001).
243 Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94,
para. 191.
244 Id. at para. 198.
245 Id. at paras. 201-22.
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severity of the punishment is commensurate with the gravity
of the act and the criminal culpability of the accused.2"6
Similarly, the Court required Trinidad to modify the conditions of its prison system
"to conform to the relevant international norms of human rights protection on the
matter."
247
With respect to the status within the legal system of all of the prisoners with
the exception of Mr. Ramiah, the Court determined that Trinidad should order
retrials and apply the new criminal legislation resulting from the reforms to the
Offenses Against the Person Act.28 The Court also ordered Trinidad and Tobago
to submit before the competent authority, and by means of the Advisory Committee
on the Power of Pardon, the review of the prisoners' cases.249 The Court further
required, "on grounds of equity," that the State abstain from executing the
petitioners in all cases, regardless of the result of the new trials.2"'
Concerning the execution of Mr. Ramiah, the Court ordered the State to pay for
non-pecuniary damages to his wife, Carol Ramcharan, the sum of U.S. $50,000 to
support and educate their child, Joanus Ramiah.25' The Court ordered a further
indemnity of U.S. $10,000 to Moonia Ramiah, the mother of Mr. Ramiah, to make
reparations for the non-pecuniary damages that she may be presumed to have
suffered as a result of the execution of her son.252 Finally, the Court ordered the
State to pay the legal representatives of the victims the sum of U.S. $13,000 as
reimbursement for the expenses they have incurred in bringing the case before
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.253
In accordance with its established practice, the Court included in its judgment
directions concerning the monitoring of the implementation of the terms of its
decision. The Court required that Trinidad and Tobago, from the date of notifica-
tion of the Court's judgment, provide the Court with a report every six months
regarding the measures taken to implement the judgment.2 54 The Court also
provided that it would oversee the implementation of the judgment and that once
24 Id. at para. 212; see also id+ at para. 223, oper. para. 8 (citing, inter alia, THE LAST
TEMPTATION OF CHRIST v. Chile, Case 11.803, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73 (2001)).
247 Id. at para. 223, oper. para. 14.
I d. at para. 223, oper. para. 9.
249 Id. at para. 223, oper. para. 10.
'0 Id. at para. 223, oper. para. 11.
2 Id. at para. 223, oper. para. 12.
252 Id. at para. 223, oper. para. 13.
25I d. at para. 223, oper. para. 15. In this regard, the petitioners' representatives did not
ask for compensation for their costs in the litigation before the Court, for the reason that they
had litigated the cases before the inter-American system pro bono.
' Id. at para. 223 oper. para. 16.
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Trinidad and Tobago had complied with its terms, the Court would deem the case
to be closed.25
As of November 27, 2003, the date of the Court's last order on compliance
with the judgment in Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin, Trinidad and Tobago had
failed to report to the Court on the measures taken to implement the Court's
decision.256 At the same time, as of this writing, none of the prisoners in the case,
with the exception of Mr. Ramiah, have been executed by Trinidad and Tobago.
Further, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council appears to have secured
compliance with at least part of the Court's judgment, by ordering that the death
sentences of persons awaiting execution at the time of its July 7, 2004, judgment in
Matthew v. The State, including the prisoners in the Hilaire, Constantine &
Benjamin litigation, be commuted to life sentences.25 7 As the following discussion
will indicate, the findings from the inter-American litigation have had a direct and
significant impact upon the decisions of the domestic courts on the mandatory death
penalty issue and, in some Caribbean states, have led to the implementation of
individualized sentencing in death penalty cases.
IV. SIGNIFICANT IMPLICATIONS OF THE MANDATORY
DEATH PENALTY LITIGATION
The litigation before the Inter-American Commission and Court in the cases
concerning the mandatory nature of the death penalty in the Caribbean region has
made significant contributions to the development of human rights standards at
the domestic and international levels in several respects. Until the Commission's
initial decision in the case of Hilaire v. Trinidad & Tobago,258 no other international
human rights tribunal had evaluated the implications of mandatory sentencing for
the implementation of the death penalty. Relevant standards had been developed,
255 Id. at para. 223, oper. para. 17.
256 Id. (noting that to date, the State had not reported to the Court on compliance with the
judgment of June 21, 2002, and specifically observing that "the State cannot elude its
obligations issuing from the June 21,2002 Judgment of the Court, despite having denounced
the Convention, for which reason it must effectively comply with the Judgment pursuant to
Article 78(2) of the Convention").
257 See Matthew v. The State, [2004] 3 W.L.R. 812, [2004] U.K.P.C. 33, para. 32-33
(appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago). In the same decision, however, the Privy Council held
that it could not declare Trinidad & Tobago's mandatory death penalty law unconstitutional
as a consequence of the "savings clause" in Trinidad's constitution, which normally prevents
laws that were in existence when the constitution came into effect from being declared an
infringement of the constitution's human rights provisions. Id. at para. 16. Accordingly, it
appears that any further measures to comply with the Inter-American Court's judgment lie
with the Parliament in Trinidad & Tobago.
258 Hilaire v. Trinidad & Tobago, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 66 (unpublished 1999),
available at www.oas.org.
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however, in the domestic legal systems of certain common law jurisdictions, and
the Commission and the Court drew upon these standards in interpreting and
applying the American Convention and American Declaration on the issue.25 9 This
exercise further defined and developed the international human rights rules,
principles, and standards that must guide the application of capital punishment.
260
The inter-American system's jurisprudence influenced the approach taken
by other tribunals on the issue of mandatory sentencing for the death penalty at
both the domestic and international levels. Since the Commission rendered its
determinations on the mandatory death penalty and the standards of procedural
fairness applicable to mercy proceedings, similar findings have been delivered by
other international and domestic tribunals, including the UNHRC, the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, and the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal.26'
For its part, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council also gave unprecedented
domestic legal effect to the procedures of the inter-American system by preventing
states from executing condemned prisoners while their complaints were pending
before the Inter-American Commission and Court.262
Taken together, these developments have demonstrated a direct and effectual
interrelationship between the articulation and implementation of human rights
standards at the national and international levels.
A. Developments in International Human Rights Law Governing the Death
Penalty
The inter-American human rights system proceedings concerning the man-
datory death penalty and related matters in Caribbean Member States have
contributed to the body of international human rights standards governing the
implementation of the death penalty in procedural matters as well as substantive
standards. In terms of procedure, both the Inter-America Commission and Court
used their procedural rules in practicable and flexible ways in order to process the
voluminous Caribbean petitions as expeditiously as possible. Processes employed
included determining the admissibility and merits of the petition in the same
decision and joining numerous individual complaints in one proceeding, and by
these means, the Commission and the Court were able to respond quickly and
effectively to the death penalty complaints. 263
259 See infra Part IV.B.
260 See infra Part IV.B.
261 See infra Part IV.C.
262 See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text (discussing the findings of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in the Thomas & Hilaire v. Baptiste case).
263 See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text (describing efforts by the Commission




In addition, both the Commission and the Court vigorously employed their
authority to order interim measures, not only to preserve the status quo ante of the
parties to the litigation, but also to perform a preventative function by seeking to
avoid irreparable damage to persons.264 In reaffirming this approach to provisional
measures, the Inter-American Court emphasized in no uncertain terms that Trinidad
and Tobago was under an international legal obligation, by virtue of its ratification
of the American Convention and as a function of the fundamental principle pacta
sunt servanda,265 to comply with the Court's provisional measures and could not
refuse to fulfill their international legal responsibility for domestic reasons.266 The
Court also clarified that the failure of a state to comply with provisional measures
in a death penalty case will result in an aggravated violation of the state's obligation
to respect the right to life under Article 4 of the Convention.267 In these respects,
the Court's findings as to the grounds for and the binding nature of its interim
measures complement and reinforce similar findings made by other international
courts and tribunals. For example, the Commission has concluded that OAS
Member States are obliged to respect the Commission's precautionary measures in
death penalty cases in order to preserve the very mandate of the Commission as an
organ under the OAS Charter.26 The UNHRC Committee,2 9 the European Court
of Human Rights, 270 and the International Court of Justice have reached similar
conclusions on the legal effect of their interim measures in cases involving capital
punishment.27'
264 See, e.g., James v. Trinidad & Tobago, Order for Provisional Measures of Dec. 2,
2003, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E) No. 4, paras. 9-10 (2003); 1999-2001 Annual Reports of
the Inter-Am. C.H.R., ch. III.C.1.
265 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
26 James, Order for Provisional Measures of Dec. 2,2003, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E) No.
4, para. 6 (2003).
267 See Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
94, para. 200 (concluding that the Trinidad & Tobago arbitrarily deprived Mr. Ramiah of the
right to life, and emphasizing the "seriousness of the State's non-compliance in virtue of the
execution of the victim despite the existence of Provisional Measures in his favour").
268 See, e.g., Garza v. United States, Case 12.243, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 52, OEA/ser.
L.N./II. 111, doc. 20 rev., para. 117 (2001), available at http://www.cidh.orglannualrep/
2000eng/ChapterIII/MeritsIUSA12.243.htm; Beazley v. United States, Case 12.412, Inter-
Am. C.H.R. 101, OEA/ser. L.N./I. 118, doc. 5 rev. 2, paras. 51-53 (2003), available at
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2003eng/usa. 12.412.htm.
269 See, e.g., Piandiong v. Philippines, Case 869/1999, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/701D/869/1999, paras. 5.1-5.4 (2000), available at http://www.unhchr.chltbs/
doc.nsf/0/8498694eee98082ac 1 2569eb0034flbb?Opendocument.
270 See, e.g., Mamatkulov v. Turkey, No. 46827/99, 68 Eur. Ct. H.R., paras. 104-07
(2003).
271 See, e.g., Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (F.R.G. v.
U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 104, paras. 22-28 (Mar. 3) (order for the indication of provisional
measures).
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With respect to the substantive international human rights standards governing
the application of capital punishment, the decisions emanating from the inter-
American system concerning the death penalty in the Caribbean region made two
particularly significant contributions. First, the Inter-American Commission and
Court clarified that an arbitrary deprivation of life will occur when a death sentence
is imposed on an individual pursuant to a law that permits no discretion by a
court to consider whether death is an appropriate punishment in light of an
offender's individual characteristics and his or her crime.272 In effect, then,
individualized sentencing has been recognized as a prerequisite for the lawful
imposition of capital punishment in the inter-American system. This in turn may
open the door to additional litigation in the Caribbean region concerning the
standards applicable to the individualized sentencing process, as has been the
case in capital petitions arising out of the United States.273 The mandatory death
penalty decisions also illustrate the progressively exceptional and limited role
that the death penalty may play as an exception to the right to life protected under
inter-American human rights instruments.
The decisions resulting from the Caribbean death penalty litigation also
articulated, for the first time in a contentious case before a regional human rights
body, the international standards of procedural fairness applicable to the right of
a condemned prisoner to seek amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence under
Article 4(6) of the American Convention. In this respect, the Commission and
the Court noted that including the ability to seek amnesty, pardon, or commutation
of sentence in the Convention, made this entitlement, like other provisions, a
right that must be rendered effective.275 When read in light of Article 8 of the
Convention, the obligation under Article 4(6) was found to require a fair and
transparent procedure by which an offender sentenced to death may make use of all
272 See, e.g., McKenzie v. Jamaica, Case 12.023, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, OEA/ser.
L.N./II.106, doc. 6, paras. 208-20 (1999), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/
99eng/merits/jamaical2.023.htm; Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin, Case 11.816, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94, paras. 102-03.
273 See, e.g., Garza, Case 12.243, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 52, paras. 90-91 (addressing the use
of evidence of unadjudicated crimes in the sentencing phase of capital prosecutions in the
United States).
274 Article 4(6) of the Convention provides: "Every person condemned to death shall have
the right to apply for amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence, which may be granted
in all cases. Capital punishment shall not be imposed while such a petition is pending
decision by the competent authority." American Convention, supra note 10, at art. 4(6); see
also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6(4), 999 U.N.T.S. 171
("Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the
sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all
cases.").
275 See, e.g., Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 94, para. 186.
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favorable evidence deemed to be relevant to the granting of mercy. While neither
the Court nor the Commission prescribed specific procedural requirements, they
found that the processes in place in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and similar
Caribbean jurisdictions failed to meet the standards under the Convention. The
processes in place provided no guidelines for the exercise of the power of pardon
by the executive, and a condemned prisoner had no right to be informed of the date
on which his or her case was to be considered, to present oral or written arguments
to the executive, or to receive the executive's decision within a reasonable time. 76
Notably, following the Commission's first published decisions in which it
found a violation of Article 4(6) of the American Convention in relation to the
mercy procedure in Caribbean jurisdictions, 77 the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council reversed its longstanding jurisprudence where the exercise of mercy was
regarded as an extra-judicial remedy not subject to judicial review. Referring to the
American Convention, the Privy Council found:
Whether or not the provisions of the Convention are
enforceable as such in domestic courts, it seems to their Lord-
ships that the States' obligation internationally is a pointer to
indicate that the prerogative of mercy should be exercised by
procedures which are fair and proper and to that end are subject
to judicial review.
The procedures followed in the process of considering a
man's petition are thus in their Lordships' view open to judicial
review....
In their Lordships' opinion it is necessary that the con-
demned man should be given notice of the date when the
Jamaican Privy Council will consider his case. That notice
should be adequate for him or his advisers to prepare represen-
tations before a decision is taken. 78
The Privy Council also indicated that when a report of an international human
rights body such as the Commission is available, it should be considered, and if
276 See, e.g., McKenzie, Case 12.023, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, paras. 230-32 (1999); Hilaire,
Constantine & Benjamin, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94 (finding that the
procedure for granting mercy to the thirty-two victims in the case was characterized by a
"lack of transparency, lack of available information and lack of participation by the victims,
resulting in a violation of Article 4(6), in conjunction with Article 8 and 1(1) of the American
Convention").
277 See, e.g., McKenzie, Case 12.023, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, paras. 230-32 (1999); Baptiste
v. Grenada, Case 11.743, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 38, OEA/ser. L./V.II. 106, doc. 6 rev. (2000).
278 Lewis v. Attorney Gen. of Jamaica, [2000] 3 W.L.R. 1785, [2001] 2 A.C. 50 (P.C.)
(appeal taken from Jam.), available athttp://www.privy-council.org.ukloutput/Page 169.asp.
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not accepted by the Executive in Jamaica, reasons should be given to explain
why.279 Further, the Court held that it was not sufficient that the condemned
prisoner be given a summary or the gist of the material available to the Jamaican
Privy Council as there are "too many opportunities for misunderstanding or
omissions," and that the representations made by a condemned prisoner should be
in writing unless the Jamaican Privy Council adopts a practice of oral hearing.28°
As discussed in Part C below, the Privy Council's findings concerning the
Prerogative of Mercy constitutes one of several areas in which the standards and
decisions of the inter-American human rights system played a role in shaping
domestic jurisprudence on the use of the death penalty in the Caribbean.
B. Influence of Decisions of National Courts on the Inter-American Human
Rights System
In rendering their findings on the impermissibility of mandatory sentencing
for the death penalty, both the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-
American Court referred to and relied on the jurisprudence of the high courts of
certain common law states which have used the death penalty. In particular, the
Commission and Court have looked at the United States, India, and South Africa.
It is apparent that, in the views of the Commission and Court, the findings of
these courts provided a useful reference in interpreting and applying pertinent
articles of the American Convention and the American Declaration in relation to
death penalty proceedings.28'
Specifically, both the Court and Commission referred to the reasoning of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Woodson v. North Carolina,8 2 which was the first high
court decision to prohibit mandatory sentencing for the death penalty in the United
States. In Woodson, the Court found a North Carolina law imposing a mandatory
death sentence for first degree murder to be in violation of the right not to be
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment and the right to due process under the
Eighth283 and Fourteenth 84 Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.28 5 Among the
279 Id.
280 Id.
21l See infra note 287 and accompanying text.
282 428 U.S. 280 (1976). See also Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
283 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (mandating that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted").
28 Id., amend. XIV, § I. Declaring that:
All persons bom or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
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grounds for the Court's decision was a finding that the mandatory death penalty
failed to allow for the particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the
character and the defendant's conviction record before imposing a sentence of
death. It was therefore inconsistent with the fundamental respect for humanity
underlying the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. The Court wrote that the mandatory death penalty is a:
process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the
character and record of the individual offender or the circum-
stances of the particular offense excludes from consideration in
fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of
compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse
frailties of humankind. It treats all persons convicted of a
designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but
as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected
to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.286
Both the Inter-American Commission and Court referred to these observations by
the U.S. Supreme Court in evaluating the mandatory death penalty in light of the
requirements of the American Convention; only the Commission, however, found
violations of the right to humane treatment under Article 5 of the Convention due
to mandatory sentencing laws.287
In shaping their approach to the mandatory death penalty issue, the Court
and Commission also cited decisions of the highest courts in South Africa and
India, other common law jurisdictions with experience in applying constitutional
human rights protections to the practice of capital punishment.288 In particular,
reliance was placed upon the South African Constitutional Court's decision in State
v. Makwanyane,219 in which the Court ultimately determined that the death penalty
was per se contrary to the South African Constitution. In reaching this conclusion,
however, the Constitutional Court suggested that the guided discretion provided to
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
285 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
286 Id. at 304.
287 See, e.g., McKenzie, Case 12.023, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, para. 215 (1999); Hilaire,
Constantine & Benjamin, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94, para. 105
(concurring with the view of the U.S. Supreme Court).
28 See, e.g., McKenzie, Case 12.023, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, paras. 216-18 (1999); Hilaire,
Constantine & Benjamin, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94, para. 103 n. 110.
289 State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SARL 391 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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South African judges to consider the personal circumstances and subjective factors
of a defendant in applying the death penalty satisfied in part the requirement that the
death penalty not be imposed arbitrarily or capriciously. 29° In a similar vein, the
Commission and Court cited longstanding jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of
India in cases such as Singh v. State of Punjab291' according to which the scope and
concept of mitigating factors in the area of the death penalty must receive a liberal
and expansive construction by the courts. The Indian Supreme Court stated that this
approach was justified by its view that: "A real and abiding concern for the dignity
of human life postulates resistance to taking a life through law's instrumentality.
That ought not to be done save in the rarest of rare cases when the alternative option
is unquestionably foreclosed."292 Accordingly, domestic constitutional jurispru-
dence had a concrete impact upon the deliberations of both the Inter-American
Commission and Court on the issue of the mandatory death penalty. While neither
body specifically articulated the legal basis for considering these authorities, it
has been recognized that decisions of national courts may serve as a subsidiary
means of determining applicable rules of international law.293 It may therefore be
inferred that the Commission and Court considered it appropriate and useful to
consider national jurisprudence on a distinctive issue such as the mandatory death
penalty. This is particularly true insofar as the jurisdictions considered were
governed by constitutions that enshrined rights analogous to those under the inter-
American human rights instruments, and where respect for those rights was
supervised by a competent, independent, and impartial judiciary. 94
2 Id.
291 (1980) 2 S.C.R. 475.
292 Id. at 534; see also Mithu v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 690, para. 12. In
invalidating a provision of the Indian Criminal Code which required the sentence of death
to be passed on a defendant convicted of murder committed while the offender was under
sentence of imprisonment of life, the court opined:
[A] provision of law which deprives the court of the use of its wise and
beneficent discretion in a matter of life and death, without regard to the
circumstances in which the offense was committed and, therefore,
without regard to the gravity of the offense, cannot but be regarded as
harsh, unjust and unfair.
Id. at para. 12.
293 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(d) (including
among the law to be applied by the Court "subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law"). See also IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (5th ed. 1998) ("Municipal decisions have
been an important source for material on recognition of belligerency, of governments and of
states, state succession, sovereign immunity, diplomatic immunity, extradition, war crimes,
belligerent occupation, the concept of a 'state of war', and the law of prize.").
294 Domestic courts have applied similar reasoning when considering the decisions of
international and foreign tribunals in interpreting their state constitutions in the context of
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C. Influence of Decisions of the Inter-American Human Rights System on
National Courts
At the same time that the Court and the Commission drew upon the human
rights jurisprudence of domestic courts in addressing the issues raised in the manda-
tory death penalty petitions, the jurisprudence of the Commission and Court had a
significant effect on the development of human rights standards by other tribunals
at the domestic and international levels.
As discussed above, the proceedings before the inter-American system
began to have a perceptible impact upon domestic death penalty litigation in the
Caribbean region with the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
in Pratt,295 where the time taken by the supervisory bodies of the inter-American
system to decide upon petitions was included within the five-year benchmark pro-
claimed by the Court. This was followed by the decision in Thomas & Hilaire,296
in which the Privy Council ventured further by precluding Trinidad and Tobago and,
subsequently, other Commonwealth Caribbean states from executing condemned
inmates while their petitions were pending before the inter-American system. It was
the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal,297 however, that first seized an opportunity
the death penalty. See, e.g.,Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SARL 391, para. 34 ("The international
and foreign authorities are of value because they analyse arguments for and against the death
sentence and show how courts of otherjurisdictions have dealt with this vexed issue. For that
reason alone they require our attention."). However, not all high court judges share this view.
See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347-48 (2002) (Scalia J., dissenting) ("I agree
with the Chief Justice... that the views of professional and religious organizations are
irrelevant. Equally irrelevant are the practices of the 'World Community', whose notions of
justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people.").
295 Pratt & Morgan v. Attorney Gen. for Jamaica, [1994] 2 A.C. 1, 4 All E.R. 769 (P.C.
1993), available at http://www.privy-council.org.uk/output/Page 171.asp.
296 Thomas & Hilaire v. Baptiste, [1999] 3 W.L.R. 249, [2000] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) (appeal
taken from Trin. & Tobago), available at http://www.privy-council.org.uk/output/
Pagel70.asp.
297 For information regarding the Eastern Carribean Court system, see http://www.
escupremecourts.org.lc.
The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court was established in 1967 by
the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court Order No. 223 of
1967 [and] is a superior court of record for nine Member States, six
independent namely Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St.
Kitts. Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and three
British Overseas Territories namely Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands
and Montserrat.
The Court sits in two divisions, the Court of Appeal and the High
Court of Justice - Trial Division.
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to consider and apply the substantive decisions of the inter-American system on
the issue of the mandatory death penalty, in determining the permissibility of
mandatory sentencing for capital punishment under the constitutions of St. Lucia
and St. Vincent. In its April 2, 2001, decision in the consolidated appeal of
Spence v. The Queen, a majority of the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal
concluded that the mandatory death penalty in St. Vincent & the Grenadines and
St. Lucia was unconstitutional as inhuman and degrading punishment under the
constitutions of those countries.29 s In his reasons for judgment, Chief Justice
Byron, one of the two majority judges, explicitly referred to the Inter-American
Commission's jurisprudence on the mandatory death penalty issue as articulated
in such decisions as McKenzie v. Jamaica2" and Baptiste v. Grenada3 0 and
concluded that "the principles they espouse are consistent with the provisions of
section 5 of the Constitution.""'' After summarizing the Commission's analysis
of the mandatory death penalty issue, the Chief Justice stated:
This rationale conforms with my understanding of a prohi-
bition against inhuman punishment and therefore explains and
gives life and meaning to the express provision of section 5 of
the Constitutions of Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent. I have found
the jurisprudence to be persuasive and I adopt it in defining the
extent of the protection which section 5 of the Constitution has
guaranteed to every citizen.3"
Chief Justice Byron went on to find that "the requirement of humanity in our
Constitution does impose a duty for consideration of the individual circumstances
of the offense and the offender before a sentence of death could be imposed in
accordance with its provisions. ' 30a
The Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal's decision respecting Peter Hughes,
together with a second Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal decision in Reyes v. The
Queen and a third decision from the Belize Supreme Court in Fox v. The Queen,
About the COA, at http://www.ecsupremecourts.org.lc/Contents/About-theECSC.htm (last
visited Dec. 11, 2004).
29 Spence v. The Queen, Crim. App. Nos. 20 of 1998 and 14 of 1997 (Apr. 2, 2001) (E.
Carib. Ct. Apps.) (appeals taken from St. Vincent & the Grenadines and St. Lucia) (judgment
from a consolidated appeal including the case of Hughes v. The Queen).
299 McKenzie, Case 12.023, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41 (1999).
'00 Baptiste, Case 11.743, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 38 (2000).
30 Spence v. The Queen, Crim. App. Nos. 20 of 1998 and 14 of 1997, para. 41 (Apr. 2,
2001) (E. Carib. Ct. Apps.) (appeals taken from St. Vincent & the Grenadines and St. Lucia)
(judgment from a consolidated appeal including the case of Hughes v. The Queen).
302 Id. at para. 45.
303 Id. at para. 46.
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were subsequently appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which
rendered three judgments on March 11, 2002." In its judgments, the Privy
Council endorsed the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal's findings as to the incom-
patibility of the mandatory death penalty with national constitutional human
rights protections. In particular, in Reyes, the Privy Council considered pertinent
domestic and international decisions relating to mandatory sentencing for the death
penalty, including the Inter-American Commission's decisions in Edwards v. The
Bahamas3 5 and McKenzie v. Jamaica,'30 and stated:
The Board is however satisfied that the provision requiring
sentence of death to be passed on the appellant on his conviction
of murder by shooting subjected him to inhuman or degrading
punishment or other treatment incompatible with his right
under section 7 of the constitution in that it required sentence of
death to be passed and precluded any judicial consideration of
the humanity of condemning him to death .... To deny the
offender the opportunity, before sentence is passed, to seek to
persuade the court that in all the circumstances to condemn him
to death would be disproportionate and inappropriate is to treat
him as no human being should be treated and thus to deny his
basic humanity, the core of the right which section 7 exists to
protect. 7
In more recent judgments, the Privy Council has continued to express the view,
based to a large extent upon the jurisprudence of the inter-American human rights
system, that the mandatory death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
under the domestic constitutions of Caribbean states, including Jamaica, Barbados,
and Trinidad and Tobago. For example, in Matthew v. The State, the majority of a
nine-member Board of the Privy Council stated:
Their Lordships consider that for reasons similar to those
given in Reyes v The Queen and Boyce and Joseph v. The Queen
the mandatory death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment
and therefore inconsistent with sections 4(a) and 5(2)(b) of
3o The Queen v. Hughes, [200212 W.L.R. 1058, [2002] U.K.P.C. 12, [2002] 2 A.C. 259
(appeal taken from St. Lucia); Fox v. The Queen, [2002] 2 W.L.R. 1077, [2002] U.K.P.C.
13, [2002] 2 A.C. 284 (appeal taken from St. Kitts & Nevis); Reyes v. The Queen, [2002]
2 W.L.R. 1034, [2002] U.K.P.C. 11, [2002] 2 A.C. 235 (appeal taken from Belize).
303 Edwards v. The Bahamas, Case 12.067, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 48, OEA/ser. L.V.II.1 11,
doc. 20 rev. (2001).
306 McKenzie, Case 12.023, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, paras. 230-32 (1999).
307 Reyes, [20021 2 W.L.R. 1034, [2002] U.K.P.C. 11, [2002] 2 A.C. 235, para. 43.
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the Constitution. Their Lordships note that Trinidad and Tobago
is, like Barbados, a party to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and a member of the Organisation of
American States and that the Human Rights Committee and
Inter-American Commission have both decided that the manda-
tory death penalty is inconsistent with the international law
obligations created by adherence to the ICCPR and membership
of the OAS respectively: see Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago
and Edwards v. The Bahamas. The principle that domestic law
should so far as possible be interpreted consistently with
international obligations and the weight of opinion expressed
in domestic cases decided in other jurisdictions supports the
conclusion that sections 4 and 5 [sic] the Constitution should be
similarly interpreted. For further discussion on this point, their
Lordships refer to the judgment in Boyce and Joseph v. The
Queen."
At the same time, as discussed further below, the Privy Council held that it could
not declare the mandatory death penalty in Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago
unconstitutional due to "savings clauses" included in those states' constitutions
that preserve pre-independence laws from scrutiny under the constitutions' human
rights provisions." In the case of Jamaica, however, the Privy Council found that
its "savings clause" did not protect Jamaica's mandatory death penalty law from
constitutional challenge because Jamaica had amended its Offences Against the
Person Act since independence to establish categories of capital and non-capital
murder and thereby removed the amended provisions from the scope of the
savings clause. Accordingly, the Privy Council declared that the death penalty in
Jamaica could only be imposed through individualized sentencing. The Privy
Council stated:
[Blasic humanity requires that the appellant should be given an
opportunity to show why the sentence of death should not be
passed on him. If he is to have that opportunity, it must be open
to the judge to take into account the facts of the case and the
appellant's background and personal circumstances. The judge
must also be in a position to mitigate the sentence by imposing,
as an alternative, a sentence of imprisonment. The mandatory
308 Matthew, [2004] W.L.R. 812, [20041 U.K.P.C. 33, para. 12 (citations omitted).
'0' See infra notes 318-22 and accompanying text.
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sentence flies in the face of these requirements, as it precludes
any consideration of the circumstances.3 10
Finally, it is notable that the doctrine of the inter-American system concerning
the mandatory death penalty has also had an influence upon other international
human rights supervisory bodies. In its December 5, 2000, views in Thompson v.
St. Vincent & the Grenadines, a majority of the UNHRC determined that the
carrying out of Mr. Thompson's death sentence would, owing to its mandatory
nature, constitute an arbitrary deprivation of his life contrary to Article 6(1) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.3 1' Among the authorities relied
upon by the author of the communication in the case, and referred to by the
Committee in its summary of facts, was the Commission's first merits decision on
the mandatory death penalty issue in Hilaire v. Trinidad & Tobago.312 It therefore
appears that the Commission's findings concerning the mandatory death penalty in
the Caribbean have also had a persuasive impact upon the approach taken by other
international human rights supervisory bodies on the same issue. The findings of
the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal and the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council on the mandatory death penalty therefore provide striking and formidable
confirmation that international human rights standards and jurisprudence can have
a direct and authoritative impact on the manner in which constitutional rights are
interpreted and applied.
D. The Challenges Continue
The developments described in this article may be acclaimed as promising
movements toward the progressive integration of international human rights
standards into the domestic legal systems of states. This is a trend that the terms
of international treaties such as the American Convention not only envision, but
require.313 In particular, where the executive or legislative branches of governments
have not taken measures to ensure that their practices conform with the require-
ments of the international human rights instruments to which they are bound,
informed and coordinated litigation before domestic courts and international
tribunals can provide an alternative and effective method of giving effect to
international human rights standards. It is notable, for example, that as a result
of the mandatory death penalty litigation in the Eastern Caribbean and Belize, the
3 0 Watson, [2004] 3 W.L.R. 841, [2004] U.K.P.C. 34, para. 34.
31 See Thompson v. St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Case 806/1998, U.N. Hum. Rts.
Comm., U.N. Doc.CCPR/CI7O/D/806/1998 (1998).
312 Id. atpara. 6.1.
... See American Convention, supra note 10, at arts. 1(1), 2.
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courts in those jurisdictions have now instituted individualized sentencing
procedures for capital punishment cases.314
At the same time, to the extent that these developments have exerted pressure
on states to amend their legislation and procedures in an area as controversial as
the death penalty, it is not unexpected that some governments would resist the
findings of domestic courts and international tribunals in this area. Indeed, efforts
have been undertaken by some Caribbean states to counter the effects of the death
See, e.g., The Queen v. Reyes, Judgment on Sentencing of Oct. 25 2002 (appeal taken
from Beliz) (unreported) (on file with author). Describing the guidelines for individualized
sentencing in death penalty cases as follows:
Therefore, in order to introduce some measure of consistency and
rationality and in keeping with the provisions of the Constitution of
Belize, it is proposed that the following guidelines be followed in the
prosecution, trial and sentencing of accused persons charged with the
offence of murder:
(i) As from the time of committal, the prosecution should give
notice as to whether they propose to submit that the death penalty is
appropriate.
(ii) The prosecution's notice should contain the grounds on which
they submit the death penalty is appropriate.
(iii) In the event of the prosecution so indicating, and the trial
judge considering that the death penalty may be appropriate, the judge
should, at the time of the allocutus, specify the date of the sentence
hearing which provides reasonable time for the defence to prepare.
(iv) Trial judge should give directions in relation to the conduct of
the sentence hearing, as well as indicating the materials that should be
made available, so that the accused may have reasonable materials for
the preparation and presentation of his case on sentence.(v) At the same time the judge should specify a time for the
defence to provide notice of any points or evidence it proposes to rely
on in relation to the sentence.
(vi) The judge should give reasons for his decision including the
statement as to the grounds on which he finds that the death penalty
must be imposed in the event that he so conclude. He should also
specify the reasons for rejecting any mitigating circumstances.
Id. at para. 26 (emphases omitted).
Applying these guidelines in the circumstances of Mr. Reyes's case, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of Belize decided that a sentence of life imprisonment, and not the
death penalty, was the appropriate punishment. Id. at para. 35. See also The Queen v.
Hughes, [2002] 2 W.L.R. 1058, [2002] U.K.P.C. 12, [2002] 2 A.C. 259 (appeal taken from
St. Lucia) (unreported) (on file with author) (remarks of the Hon. Mr. Justice Adrian
Saunders on sentencing Peter Hughes to twenty years' imprisonment for the murder of Jason
Jean); Fox v. The Queen, [20021 2 W.L.R. 1077, [2002] U.K.P.C. 13, [20021 2 A.C. 284
(appeal from St. Kitts & Nevis) (unreported) (on file with author) (remarks of Justice




penalty jurisprudence from the inter-American system as well as the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council. This has included, for example, renewed efforts
to create a Caribbean Court of Justice that would replace the Privy Council as the
highest appellate court for those states accepting its jurisdiction.315 The ceremo-
nial inauguration of the Caribbean Court of Justice ("CCJ") was to have taken place
in November 2004 but, as of this writing, has been postponed to facilitate some
member countries, such as Trinidad and Tobago, that have not yet enacted domestic
legislation necessary to render the CCJ the court of final appeal in those countries.316
In addition, through a series of recent appeals from Barbados, Jamaica, and
Trinidad and Tobago,a1 7 the governments of Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago
succeeded in arguing before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council that the
"savings clauses" contained in their national constitutions precluded the courts
from declaring that their mandatory death penalty laws infringed the fundamental
rights and freedoms protected under the same constitutions. 3" This has led to
35 There has been a longstanding debate in the Caribbean region over the possible
creation of a regional Caribbean Court of Justice that would replace the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council as the final appellate court for all participating Caribbean states. See
NEWTON, supra note 1, at 86-88 (indicating that as early as 1972 the Organization of
Commonwealth Caribbean Bar Associations "reported in favour of a regional third tier court"
that would, inter alia, "have a permanent home and library facilities in one of the
participating territories" and would "consist of a President or Chief Justice and four Justices
of Appeal to be appointed by the majority vote of the Heads of Government of the
participating territories"). These recommendations were not implemented, in part because
the proposals were not favorably received in Trinidad & Tobago by the 1974 Trinidad &
Tobago Constitution Review Commission. In 2001, however, agreement was finally reached
among Caribbean states on the establishment of the Court, which will be the highest court
in the region for appeal cases involving both criminal and civil matters in those countries that
ratify the Court's treaty, and will also have jurisdiction over the interpretation and application
of the Treaty of Chaguaramnas establishing the Caribbean Community. See Agreement
Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, Feb. 14, 2001, available at
http://www.caricom.org. As of this writing, preparatory work for the Court's operations
remains underway. See Press Release, Caribbean Community Secretariat, Caribbean Court
of Justice Final Agreement Enters into Force (Feb. 11, 2004), at http://www.caricom.org/
pressreleases/pres17_04.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2004).
316 Rickey Singh, Doubts About Readiness for CSME Deadline, JAM. OBSERVER, Nov. 8,
2004, available at http://www.jamaicaobserver.com.
317 See Matthew, [2004] 3 W.L.R. 812, [2004] U.K.P.C. 33; Boyce, [2004] 3 W.L.R. 786,
[2004] U.K.P.C. 32; Watson, [2004] 3 W.L.R. 841, [2004] U.K.P.C. 34.
38 In its judgment in Matthew, for example, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
held that the language and purpose of the "savings clause" under section 6 of Trinidad's
constitution, which prevents the human rights provisions under sections 4 and 5 of the
constitution from invalidating, inter alia, any law that had effect as part of the law of Trinidad
and Tobago immediately before the commencement of the constitution, were "so clear that
whatever may be their Lordships views about the morality or efficacy of the death penalty,
they are bound as a court of law to give effect to it." Matthew, [2004] 3 W.L.R. 812, [2004]
U.K.P.C. 33, para. 2.
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the regressive result that the mandatory death penalty, and possibly other pre-
independence legislation - the very laws that are most likely to defy evolving
human rights standards - are immune from challenge under the human rights
provisions of certain national constitutions. As the Inter-American Court
expressly noted in respect of the savings clause in Trinidad's constitution,
however, no such impediment exists concerning states' international human
rights commitments, based upon the fundamental principle that a state "cannot
invoke provisions of its domestic law as justification for failure to comply with
its international obligations."3 9 Indeed, the four-member minority in Matthew
v. The State observed that by accepting the majority's interpretation of
Trinidad's savings clause, the Privy Council itself put Trinidad in breach of its
international obligations under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the American Declaration,
and the American Convention.2 °
Further, several Caribbean states have endeavored to amend their constitutions
in order to neutralize the effects of the recent death penalty jurisprudence from the
Privy Council and the inter-American human rights system. In particular, in
September 2002, the State of Barbados, through the Barbados Constitutional
(Amendment) Act,32' enacted changes to its constitution that, inter alia, prevent
persons sentenced to death from challenging their sanctions as being contrary to
the right to humane treatment based upon the mandatory nature of the sanction
imposed or the delay or conditions under which the person is held pending the
execution of a sentence of death. The amendments also permit the government to
prescribe time limits within which appeals or consultations by condemned prisoners
to bodies outside of Barbados, such as the Inter-American Commission and Court,
must be concluded, beyond which executions may be carried out notwithstanding
a pending appeal or consultation.322
319 Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin v. Trinidad & Tobago, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 94, para. 152(c) (2002); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339.
320 Matthew, [2004] 3 W.L.R. 812, [2004] U.K.P.C. 33, para. 59 (Lord Bingham of
Cornhill, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, and Lord Steyn and Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe,
dissenting).
321 BARB. CONST. (Constitutional Amendment Act, 2002), in Supp. to Official Gazette,
No. 74 (Sept. 5, 2002).
322 Sections 2,4, and 5 of the Barbados Constitutional (Amendment) Act, 2002, provide
as follows:
2. Subject to section 5 of this Act, section 15 of the Constitution
[providing for the right to protection from inhuman treatment] is
amended by adding the following subsection:
(3) The following shall not be held to be inconsistent with or in
contravention of this section:
(a) the imposition of a mandatory sentence of death or the
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The amendments to the Barbados Constitution came into operation on
September 5, 2002, approximately two months after the Inter-American Court's
June 21, 2002, judgment in the case of Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin. Similar
execution of such a sentence;
(b) any delay in executing a sentence of death imposed on a
person in respect of a criminal offense under the law of
Barbados of which he has been convicted;
(c) the holding of any person who is in prison, or otherwise
lawfully detained, pending execution of a sentence of
death imposed on that person, in conditions, or under
arrangements, which immediately before the coming into
operation of the Constitutional (Amendment) Act, 2002
(i) were prescribed by or under the Prisons Act, as then
in force; or
(ii) were otherwise practiced in Barbados in relation to
persons so in prison or so detained.
4. Section 78 of the Constitution [addressing the prerogative of
mercy] is amended by adding the following subsections:
(5) A person has the right to submit directly or through a legal or
other representative written representation in relation to the
exercise by the Governor-General or the Privy Council of any
of their respective functions under this section but is not
entitled to an oral hearing.
(6) The Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice
of the Privy Council, may by instrument under the Public Seal
direct that there shall be time-limits within which persons
referred to in subsection (1) may appeal to, or consult, any
person or body of persons (other than Her Majesty in Council)
outside Barbados in relation to the offense in question; and,
where a time-limit that applies in the case of a person by
reason of such a direction has expired, the Governor-General
and the Privy Council may exercise their respective functions
under this section in relation to that person, notwithstanding
that such an appeal or consultation as aforesaid relating to that
person has not been concluded.
(7) Nothing contained in subsection (6) shall be construed as being
inconsistent with the right referred to in paragraph (c) of
section 11.
5. The amendment made by section 2 of this Act to section 15 of
the Constitution does not apply in relation to a person on whom a
sentence of death was pronounced before the coming into operation of
this Act.
BARB. CONST. (Constitutional Amendment Act, 2002) §§ 2, 4-5.
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amendments have been contemplated by Belize and Jamaica, although none have
been enacted in those states.3
23
It is apparent that these various and most radical efforts undertaken by states
in the region are aimed at limiting or reversing the jurisprudential developments
that have occurred in the national courts in the Caribbean, as well as within the
inter-American system, by amending their constitutions to create exceptions to the
application of fundamental rights among segments of their populations. In a series
of general hearings before the Commission in 2002 and 2003, several Caribbean
Member States aggressively defended their constitutional and other initiatives.324
Partly as a result, during its 119th regular period of sessions in March 2004, the
Commission decided to seek an advisory opinion from the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights pursuant to Article 64(1) of the American Convention, asking
the Court to determine whether it is inconsistent with Articles 1(1), 2, 4, 5, 8, 25,
and 44 of the American Convention, and corresponding protections under the
American Declaration, for states to take legislative or other measures that deny
persons sentenced to death access to judicial or other effective recourse to challenge
the sanction imposed on certain grounds, namely: because it is the mandatory
punishment for the person's crime; because of the delay or conditions under which
the person has been detained; or because the person has a complaint pending before
the inter-American human rights system. The Commission filed the request on
April 20, 2004, and as of this writing the Court has established a March 31, 2005,
deadline for the filing of written comments by interested parties in accordance with
Article 62 of the Court's Rules of Procedure.32s
323 See BELIZE CONST. (Fifth Amendment) Bill, 2002; Jamaica People's National Party
2002, Election Manifesto, § P56.
324 See Press Release No. 44/02, Inter-Am. C.H.R., The IACHR Closes Its 116th Ordinary
Session, annex pt. III (Oct. 25, 2002); Press Release No. 04/03 Inter-Am. C.H.R., IACHR
Concludes 117th Regular Session, annex pt. III (Mar. 10, 2003); Press Release 30/03, Inter-
Am. C.H.R., IACHR Concludes Its 118th Regular Session, annex pt. III (Oct. 24, 2003); see
also Boyce, [20041 3 W.L.R. 786, [2004] U.K.P.C. 32, para. 81.
325 Article 62 of the Court's Rules of Procedure prescribes the procedure on requests for
advisory opinion as follows:
1. On receipt of a request for an advisory opinion, the Secretary
shall transmit copies thereof to all the member states, to the
Commission, to the Secretary General and to the OAS organs whose
spheres of competence relate to the subject of the request, if
appropriate.
2. The President shall fix the time-limits for the filing of written
comments by the interested parties.
3. The President may invite or authorize any interested party to
submit a written opinion on the issues covered by the request. If the
request is governed by Article 64(2) of the Convention, he may do so
after consultation with the Agent.
4. At the conclusion of the written proceedings, the Court shall
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The foregoing therefore indicates that this chapter in the development of
international human rights standards in the Caribbean region is not yet closed. The
advances have been formidable and encouraging. At the same time, considerable
resistance to these changes remains on the part of some states, and therefore
further interaction between governments, the domestic courts, and international
human rights supervisory bodies may well be necessary in attempting to define the
standards under which the death penalty may continue to be implemented in the
Commonwealth Caribbean.
CONCLUSION
The recent litigation in the Caribbean region concerning the mandatory death
penalty has proven significant for the development of human rights standards at
several levels. Internationally, the cases have tested the ability of human rights
treaty bodies to respond to voluminous and urgent complaints in a timely and
effective way and have led to material advances in the international principles and
standards governing the implementation of capital punishment based in part upon
national precedents. At the domestic level, courts have found value in drawing upon
the terms of human rights instruments and the associated decisions of their
supervisory institutions in order to give informed and progressive meaning and
effect to the rights and freedoms enshrined in regional constitutions. In doing so,
the judicial branches of regional governments have given meaningful effect to
the principle of effectiveness, according to which the obligation to ensure the
free and full exercise of human rights requires not only the existence of a legal
system designed to make it possible to comply with this obligation, but also that
governments conduct themselves so as to effectively ensure the free and full
exercise of human rights.326 Moreover, the national courts have extended this
principle beyond the substantive guarantees in the inter-American human rights
instruments to encompass the international procedures by which compliance with
those guarantees is supervised.
It remains to be seen whether and to what extent the other branches of
government may follow the example established by the courts by giving genuine
effect to their international human rights commitments through appropriate legal
reforms and other internal measures. Recent developments, however, suggest
decide whether there should be oral proceedings and shall fix the date
for such a hearing, unless it delegates the latter task to the President. In
cases governed by Article 64(2) of the Convention, a prior consultation
with the Agent is required.
Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, supra note 44, at art. 62.
326 See Velisquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Case 7920, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4,
paras. 167-68 (1988), 28 I.C.M. 291 (1989); Godinez-Cruz v. Honduras, Case 8097, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 5, paras. 176-77 (1989).
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that a conciliatory approach is unlikely to emerge in the near future, at least
concerning the issue of capital punishment. Nevertheless, the mandatory death
penalty litigation has set a valuable precedent for the protection of human rights in
the Caribbean region, one that should be drawn upon by advocates and courts in
other jurisdictions who are attempting to give full effect to states' human rights
commitments.
